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AGGREGATION AND LAW
Ariel Porat and Eric A. Posner*

If a plaintiff brings two claims, each with a 0.4 probability of being valid,
the plaintiff will usually lose, even if the claims are based on independent
events, and thus the probability of at least one of the claims being valid is
0.64. If a plaintiff brings two independent claims, and each of them is too
weak to justify a remedy, the plaintiff will usually lose, even if the claims
are jointly powerful enough to justify a remedy. Thus, as a general rule
courts refuse to engage in what we call factual aggregation (the first case)
and normative aggregation (the second case). (We also identify other forms
of aggregation.) Yet we show numerous exceptions to this rule in private
and public law. Notably, in public law the hybrid rights doctrine permits
courts to aggregate two weak constitutional claims as long as one involves
free exercise of religion. In private law, certain tort and contract doctrines
also permit aggregation. We criticize the courts’ inconsistent approaches
to aggregation, and propose conditions under which courts should (and
should not) aggregate.

*
Ariel Porat is Alain Poher Professor of Law at Tel Aviv University, and Fischel-Neil
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School; Eric A.
Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School. For
very helpful comments we thank Hanoch Dagan, Shai Dothan, Lee Fennell, Talia Fisher,
Daniel Hemel, Aziz Huq, Roy Kreitner, Shai Lavi, Daryl Levinson, Richard McAdams,
Martha Nussbaum, Adam Samaha, Adrian Vermeule, Laura Weinrib, Eyal Zamir, and
participants in the law and economics workshop at Tel Aviv University. Thanks to Lior
Kotler, Ellie Norton, and Omer Yehezkel for very able research assistance.

2

AGGREGATION AND LAW

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 2
I. TORT LAW ................................................................................................................. 7
A. Factual Aggregation ....................................................................................... 7
B. Normative Aggregation and Mixed Aggregation ............................................ 14
C. Cross-Person Aggregation .............................................................................. 18
II. CONTRACT LAW ................................................................................................... 20
A. Factual Aggregation ..................................................................................... 20
B. Normative Aggregation.................................................................................. 22
C. Cross-Person Aggregation .............................................................................. 24
III. CRIMINAL LAW .................................................................................................... 25
A. Factual Aggregation ..................................................................................... 25
B. Normative Aggregation.................................................................................. 30
C. Cross-Person Aggregation .............................................................................. 32
IV. PUBLIC LAW ......................................................................................................... 34
A. Factual Aggregation ..................................................................................... 34
B. Normative Aggregation.................................................................................. 35
C. Cross-Person Aggregation .............................................................................. 40
V. EXPLANATIONS AND PROPOSALS ..................................................................... 42
A. The Arbitrariness of Legal Boundaries ......................................................... 42
B. Other Explanations and Possible Objections to Aggregation .......................... 44
1. Corrective Justice .............................................................................. 44
2. Incommensurability .......................................................................... 45
3. Cognitive Limitations ....................................................................... 47
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 48

INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are invited to a dinner by a friend. You are a bit tired, but
not extremely tired, so that reason by itself would not make you decline the
invitation. You also feel you want to spend the evening with your family,
but this reason standing alone would not convince you to stay at home.
Finally, you are also a bit pressed for time since you need to prepare a
lecture for tomorrow, but once again you would not miss the dinner for that
reason only. It is quite plausible that even if none of the reasons, standing
alone, is sufficient for you to decline the invitation, the aggregation of all
three reasons would be sufficient. Nevertheless, we suspect that most
people, while aggregating the three reasons for themselves and declining
the invitation, would not say to their friend that they cannot come to dinner
because: (1) they are tired; (2) they want to spend the evening with their
family; and (3) they need to prepare a lecture for tomorrow so they are
pressed for time. They would instead choose the strongest of the three
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reasons and provide it as the sole reason for declining the invitation.
Consider another possibility. Your friend invites you to dinner a week
in advance. Peering into the future, you predict that with some (low)
probability you will be too tired, that with some (low) probability your
children will need help with their homework, and that with some (low)
probability you will need to prepare for work on the following day. You
realize that while each event will individually come to pass with low
probability, the probability that at least one of the events will come to pass
is quite high. Even so, you would not say to your friend (if you want to
keep your friendship) that while each reason you have for turning down the
invitation is low-probability, they are jointly high-probability. Most likely,
you would turn down the invitation on the basis of the most probable
reason.
These puzzles, which we call “aggregation puzzles,” have
counterparts in the law. Consider a plaintiff who brings two separate claims
against the defendant. Plaintiff argues in the alternative that defendant
committed a strict liability tort by driving an inherently dangerous vehicle,
and caused a tort through negligent driving. To win on the strict liability
claim, plaintiff must prove that the vehicle was inherently dangerous, but
plaintiff can provide evidence to show only a 40 percent probability of
inherent dangerousness. In addition, plaintiff can show only a 40 percent
probability of negligence. A court would hold against the plaintiff because
she cannot meet the 50 percent threshold for either claim. However, the
plaintiff can show a 64 percent probability that the defendant committed
either one tort or the other.1 Yet a court does not permit this type of crossclaim factual aggregation.2
For another example, consider a plaintiff who can prove with 40
percent probability that defendant engaged in a material breach of a
contract, and also can prove with 40 percent probability that defendant
engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation inducing the creation of the
contract. Under either theory, plaintiff would be entitled to rescission of the
contract. Yet again, although the probability that at least one claim is valid
is 64 percent, plaintiff would lose, because courts do not permit cross-claim
factual aggregation. By contrast, within-claim factual aggregation, where
courts simply aggregate the probabilities of the various allegations that
make up a single claim, is routine.
A third type of aggregation does not require uncertainty. Suppose that
plaintiff can show with certainty that defendant engaged in a minor form of
fraudulent misrepresentation inducing the creation of the contract and that
defendant engaged in a breach that falls just short of material. A court
would typically not grant rescission. The plaintiff would lose the first claim

1

The probability of at least one claim being valid is 1-0.62 = 0.64.
A variant, which we discuss infra text accompanying notes 22–23, is cross-element
aggregation—where a court aggregates across elements within one cause of action.
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because the fraud would be deemed mere puffery, and the second claim
because the breach is not material. Yet one could argue that even if the two
bad acts by defendant do not independently justify rescission, they jointly
justify rescission.
Courts usually do not permit what we will call cross-claim normative
aggregation. Yet in an important class of cases they do. When a neutral and
generally applicable statute burdens religious exercise alone, it does not
violate the First Amendment; but if the law simultaneously burdens another
constitutional right as well, such as the right to free speech, and yet not to a
sufficient degree as to violate that right by itself, the law may nonetheless
be overturned because it burdens two constitutional rights.3
One can also imagine cases that share elements of cross-claim factual
aggregation and cross-claim normative aggregation. Suppose that the
plaintiff can prove material breach with probability 40 percent, while the
level of deception underlying the fraudulent misrepresentation claim
remains a touch below what is necessary to allow rescission of the contract.
One might argue that the plaintiff should be entitled to rescind the contract,
but courts do not permit this type of cross-claim mixed aggregation.
A fifth type of aggregation takes place across persons. Suppose that a
firm pollutes the air, and ten nearby residents claim that they were injured
by the pollution. Each resident can show that she breathed in the pollution
and that her medical condition deteriorated after the pollution, but all
residents suffer from preexisting respiratory ailments, and thus cannot
show with probability above 50 percent that the pollution rather than their
preexisting conditions caused their harm. They would therefore lose their
cases. Yet if each resident could show that the probability that the pollution
exacerbated her medical condition is, say, 10 percent, then the residents can
collectively prove that the probability that at least one of them was injured
was greater than 50 percent, and therefore that the firm should pay damages
(although not necessarily everyone’s damages—an issue we will address
later).4 We call this type of aggregation cross-person aggregation. Crossperson aggregation could be factual as in the preceding example, but also
normative or mixed.5
These examples illustrate an important vulnerability at the heart of the
law. They reflect the fact that law relies on legal categories that organize
the judicial treatment of disputes. These categories, which operate at
3

See infra notes 93–98 and accompanying text.
The probability that at least one resident was injured is 1-0.910 ≈ 0.65.
5
The phrase “aggregation” could have various meanings in different contexts. In particular,
the law often allows aggregation for evidentiary purposes: a noteworthy example is the prior
acts and similar crimes doctrines applied in criminal law (see infra text accompanying notes
67–77), according to which past behavior of the accused could serve as evidence to prove
his guilt in the present case. What is typical to this type of aggregation is the dependence
between the accused’s different misbehaviors. Our focus instead is on aggregation of
independent claims, although we admit that sometimes the distinction between the two types
of aggregation is blurred.
4
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different levels of generality, include bodies of law (tort, contract), claims
(strict liability, negligence), and elements (offer, acceptance, breach, harm).
These categories are important, and it is hard to imagine how the law
would work without them. But they also require courts to disregard certain
types of information that is relevant to an overall evaluation of the asserted
wrongdoing.
This happens in the ways we have illustrated. First, some of the
factual information that is relevant for evaluating the wrongdoing of the act
must be disregarded when one claim is evaluated, and other factual
information must be disregarded when another claim is evaluated, even if
the two claims stem from the same event. An act that is not clearly a strict
liability tort and at the same time not clearly a negligence tort may
nonetheless clearly be one or the other, and thus a wrongful act that should
entitle the victim to a remedy. A similar phenomenon transpires when the
two (or more) claims relate to two (or more) events, and each event is
considered separately, isolated from one another.
Second, the law relies heavily on thresholds even when wrongdoing is
typically a continuous variable.6 One must reach one normative threshold
to show fraudulent misrepresentation and another normative threshold to
show material breach. But where an event that falls just short of the
thresholds in two separate legal dimensions, or two events individually falls
short of the threshold, the threshold may be exceeded when those
dimensions, or events, are aggregated. The defendant who does not quite
engage in fraudulent misrepresentation and does not quite engage in
material breach may nonetheless have acted wrongfully in her overall
treatment of the plaintiff.
Third, the law generally treats individuals as the unit of analysis, even
though wrongdoing can often be probabilistic, in a sense transcending
individuals. The point is not just that a firm that causes a small amount of
harm to a large number of people may escape liability because no
individual possess a sufficient incentive to bring suit. This is a familiar
problem, one that is addressed by the class action system. The problem is
that even if each individual faced zero legal costs, she would lose her case.
The harm is low-probability or, alternatively, does not quite reach the
normative threshold for each individual, but across many persons, it
becomes significant.
Each of these cases bears a family resemblance to each other; they all
stem from the problem of aggregating two types of things: factual

6

Cf. John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise—The Uses of Doubt and
Reason, 58 NW. U. L. REV. 750 (1964), which argues that the law has a clear preference for
“all or nothing” solutions even when those solutions are harsh, and calls for court-imposed
compromises based on the idea that there is a continuum of solutions between the two
polarized ones: “[I]mposed compromise shall mean the apportionment of right and duty
between opposed litigants by a court according to a quantitative standard that is not limited
to the favoring of one party to the exclusion of his adversary.” Id. at 753.
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information and normative weight. In the bulk of this Article, we will
examine additional examples from torts, contracts, criminal law, and
constitutional law, and then we will provide explanations and some
tentative proposals for reform. Our focus will be general explanations and
proposals which apply to aggregations in all fields of law. We summarize
our conclusions here.
All of the cases reflect a familiar rules/standards tradeoff. The law
disaggregates in order to reduce decision costs for courts and other
decision-makers, including ordinary people and firms who want to obey the
law. The basic breakdown of wrongdoing into bodies of law, and then
those bodies of law into claims, and those claims into elements, greatly
simplifies the process of learning and applying the law. But the
disaggregation of wrongdoing into a series of rules comes at a cost: morally
relevant information is lost.
To some extent, the law already recognizes this problem. Certain
doctrines permit courts in certain cases to re-aggregate disaggregated
claims. We will discuss examples later, but for now a few such examples
that might be cited are the alternative liability and market share liability
doctrines in tort law, the unconscionability doctrine in contract law, and the
hybrid rights doctrine for the Free Exercise Clause in constitutional law.
These doctrines permit courts to aggregate claims that would otherwise be
kept separate under more conventional types of legal analysis.
However, we will argue that the law falls short in many significant
respects, some of them illustrated by our examples above. Our minimal
goal is to propose “reaggregation doctrines” that permit courts to aggregate
factual and normative claims where doing so does not create excessive
confusion. Our more ambitious goal is to suggest general parameters for
the optimal level of aggregation in the law.
The Article proceeds as follows. Parts I to IV analyze the nonaggregation problem in tort law, contract law, criminal law and
constitutional law, respectively. Part V discusses explanations and
justifications for courts’ refusal to aggregate, offers a theory for analyzing
aggregation problems in the law, and proposes methods of implementation.
The conclusion summarizes the discussion.7

7
Aggregation has largely been ignored by legal writers. A notable exception is Saul
Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723 (2001). Levmore’s
discussion, however, is limited to factual aggregation, and is focused on tort law,
specifically on factual aggregation across the elements of the same cause of action (see infra
discussion accompanying notes 22–24). Some parts of Levmore’s discussion, in particular
his pointing out of implementation difficulties in aggregation, could be relevant to some
types of factual aggregation that we discuss, but not to others. Another exception is Alon
Harel & Ariel Porat, Aggregating Probabilities Across Cases: Criminal Responsibility for
Unspecified Offenses, 94 MINN. L. REV. 261 (2009). Harel and Porat analyzed factual
aggregation in criminal law, and focused on situations where the accused is charged with
two or more separate offenses, none of them can be proven beyond reasonable doubt, but
there is no reasonable doubt that he committed at least one of them. Schauer and Zeckhauser
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I. TORT LAW
A. Factual Aggregation
Factual aggregation in tort law is common for determining whether
the defendant committed a specific wrong at a given time and place. This is
what we call within-claim factual aggregation. Thus, “if a car parked at the
curb by the defendant begins to roll downhill” and hits the plaintiff, and the
reason for this could be that the defendant “either failed to set the brakes or
failed to cut the wheels properly against the curb, or failed to put the car in
parking gear,” then the court could find the defendant liable even without
knowing exactly why she was at fault.8
Courts, however, do not engage in cross-claim factual aggregations.
Consider the following example:
Example I.1. The Inherently Dangerous Vehicle. Defendant hit plaintiff while
driving his vehicle. Plaintiff argues in the alternative that the vehicle was
inherently dangerous, and that defendant caused the harm by his negligent
driving. The plaintiff, however, cannot establish his claims by the
preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the plaintiff can only show that
the probability of each claim is 40%.

Non-aggregation results in both claims being rejected. If instead the
court deciding the case aggregates the two claims, it will impose liability
on the defendant, since the probability that the defendant wrongfully hit the
plaintiff is 64%, and this is more than enough for establishing liability.9
Courts, however, do not aggregate in cases illustrated by Example I.1.10 As
proposed aggregating probabilities across cases outside the judicial context. Frederick
Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, On the Degree of Confidence for Adverse Decisions, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 27, 41–51 (1996). Schauer and Zeckhauser argued that it would make sense
for a school to dismiss a teacher against whom several complaints of sexual harassment had
been made in the past, even if each complaint, considered separately, would not constitute
sufficient reason for dismissal. Schauer and Zeckhauser maintain, however, that such an
argument is inapplicable to criminal proceedings. Id. Levinson considers cases where
remedies like school desegregation decrees are based on a kind of aggregation—of multiple
past behaviors by government entities (a kind of cross-claim factual aggregation) against
multiple persons (a kind of cross-person aggregation). See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing
Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311 (2002).
8
For this example and others, see DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 154 (2000).
9
The probability that either claim is valid is 1-0.42 = 0.64.
10
In Keitz v. Commonwealth, No. 3:11-cv-00061, LEXIS 114850 (W.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011),
the plaintiff arrived at the Emergency Room (ER) of the defendant’s hospital following a
severe panic attack. Later he sued the hospital in tort for its failure to properly treat him at
the admittance stage, based on two claims: the first that the defendant violated the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), and the second that the
defendant was negligent in treating him at the ER during admittance. The court decided that
both the violation of the EMTALA and the defendant’s negligence were not sufficiently
proven and dismissed the suit. (The negligence suit was also dismissed, for procedural
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a result, defendants escape liability even when the probability that they
wrongfully harmed the plaintiff is greater than 50%, just because the
plaintiff cannot establish what exactly the wrong committed by the
defendant was.
The next two examples represent a cross-claim factual aggregation
relating to two separate events.
Example I.2. Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, One Injury. Plaintiff was
admitted into hospital while undergoing a heart attack. At the first stage the
doctor at the emergency room misdiagnosed him and sent him home, and at
the second stage, two days later, another doctor in the cardiology department
gave him allegedly poor treatment during a return visit. Plaintiff did not fully
recover. He sues the hospital for vicarious liability, arguing that the two
doctors were negligent, and that each doctor’s negligence is a but-for cause of
his injury. The evidence before the court indicates that the probability that
each of the doctors caused the harm negligently is only 40%.

In contrast to Example I.1, in Example I.2 there are two separate
events occurring in different times and places and for their injurious effects
the same defendant (the hospital) could be (vicariously) liable. If the two
claims relating to the two events are estimated separately, liability should
not be imposed; if instead the two claims are aggregated, the court should
hold the defendant liable, even though it cannot determine which of the two
events was the wrongful one.
It seems that courts would not aggregate in cases represented by
Example I.2,11 but there is some lack of clarity about that. In some cases,

reasons, but the court related to the feasibility of proving negligence despite the procedural
issue). If the court had allowed aggregation of the two claims, it may have reached a
different result.
In Candler General Hosp. v. McNorrill, 354 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. 1987), the plaintiff fell and
hurt his knee while being transferred by a nurse from a stretcher to a wheelchair. The
plaintiff argued that the hospital was vicariously liable for the nurse's malpractice, as well as
directly liable for negligence due to the inadequacy of the equipment and personnel in the
Emergency Room. The court ordered that both claims should be presented before a jury, but
didn't discuss aggregation of the claims. It is quite possible that the jury would dismiss the
suit if both claims were examined separately, but would accept them if aggregated.
11
In Greig v. Botros, No. 08-1181-EFM, LEXIS 25862 (D. Kan. Mar. 14, 2011), a doctor
admitted a patient with chest pains to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of the defendant
medical center without performing any tests. Six hours later, a second doctor visited the
patient at the ICU, and although the patient complained that the pain was worse, the second
doctor too failed to order any test. Each of the two doctors could have ordered a CT scan,
which, if performed, would have saved the patient’s life. With aggregation, the medical
center would be vicariously liable for the wrongful death of the patient if it could be proven
by the preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the two doctors was negligent in
failing to order the CT scan, even if none of the claims standing alone could be proven.
In Brown v. StarMed Staffing, 490 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. App. 1997), a patient was admitted to
the Emergency Room at the defendant hospital, treated by a doctor and a nurse with a
specific mediation which was proven later to be wrong, and later discharged from the
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courts were willing to impose liability on hospitals, when it was established
that the plaintiff suffered harm from the negligence of one of the hospital’s
employees, even if the identity of the specific employee who negligently
caused the harm remained unknown.12 Furthermore, if in Example I.2 both
doctors’ negligence had been established by the preponderance of the
evidence, and only causation had not been established by the
preponderance of the evidence, it seems that courts would allow
aggregation, and even impose joint and several liability on the two doctors.
That latter result could be achieved if courts apply the “alternative liability
rule”, first established in Summers v. Tice,13 and later adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Under the alternative liability rule, as
prescribed in the Restatement, “[w]here the conduct of two or more actors
is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by
only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the
burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.” 14
Indeed, the alternative liability rule has been applied to cases of one, rather
than two events,15 but its logic seems to apply also to two- (or more) event
cases, as long as the negligence of each defendant can be proven by the
preponderance of the evidence.16
hospital by another doctor. The same day, the patient died. The court ruled that the trial
court did not err in denying the hospital's motion for summary judgment. As it appears from
the facts as presented by the court, there was a factual dispute regarding the negligence of
each of the two doctors. Here, too, aggregation could bring about a different outcome than if
each allegation with respect to each doctor were examined separately. Furthermore, the
defendant hospital raised several defenses with respect to its vicarious liability for the
nurse’s negligence, for which aggregation could also yield a different outcome than if each
defense were examined separately.
12
In Fieux v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Clinic, P.C., 978 P.2d 429 (Or. 1999), a clamp was
left behind on the plaintiff's heart during a surgery. The plaintiff could not prove who of the
medical staff, composed of three nurses and one surgeon, was negligent. He relied on res
ipsa loquitur to infer negligence. The court imposed liability on the nurses, the surgeon, and
also on the hospital for vicarious liability.
13
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (imposing liability on two hunters for the injury one
of them caused the plaintiff; while both hunters negligently shot in the plaintiff’s direction,
the identity of the one who actually injured the plaintiff was not established).
14
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §432B(3).
15
The wording of the Restatement, id., also seems to apply for one-event cases (“Where the
conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the
plaintiff by only one of them...”) (emphasis added). It was argued by David W. Robertson,
The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1787 (1997), that the same
reasoning the court used in Summers v. Tice, supra note 13, was implicitly used in Saunders
Sys. Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 117 So. 72 (Ala. 1928). In Saunders, two separate acts
allegedly caused a road accident: one act by the car rental company, which allegedly rented
the car with bad brakes, and the other act by the driver, who allegedly failed to use the
brakes, or used them too late. But see Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw.
1991) (rejecting the argument that the alternative liability rule applies when defendants did
not act simultaneously); Skipworth v. Lead Industries Ass’n, 690 A.2d 169 (Penn. 1997)
(same).
16
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §432B(3) cmt. h: “The cases thus far decided in
which the rule stated in Subsection (3) has been applied all have been cases in which all of
the actors involved have been joined as defendants. All of these cases have involved
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In the next example, although not different in substance from Example
I.2, courts would clearly avoid any aggregation.
Example I.3. Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries. Same facts as
in Example I.2, except that each doctor allegedly caused the plaintiff,
negligently, separate harm: the doctor in the emergency room allegedly
caused him a necrosis in his leg, and the doctor in the cardiology department
allegedly injured his heart. The likelihood of each allegation is 40%.

With no aggregation, the hospital – as well as the two doctors – will
bear no liability, even though the probability that the plaintiff suffered
harm due to a wrongdoing for which the hospital is responsible is 64%.
Aggregation, instead, would lead to the imposition of liability on the
hospital. Indeed, analogizing from the cases imposing vicarious liability on
hospitals in cases similar to the one illustrated by Example I.2, and from
the alternative liability rule, one could make the argument that in Example
I.3 the hospital should be held liable toward the plaintiff, and if both
doctors’ negligence has been proven by the preponderance of the evidence,
they should also be liable even if causation with respect to each of them
cannot be proven by the preponderance of the evidence.
If aggregation in Example I.3 is done, what amount of liability would
be imposed on the hospital? At a minimum, the hospital would be liable for
the less severe injury. Alternatively, the hospital could be liable for the
average17 of the two injuries, or for the more severe injury. Each of these
options has both advantages and disadvantages, depending in part on the
theory of tort law one adopts. At this stage it suffices to say that nonaggregation in cases represented by both examples I.2 and I.3 would allow
defendants to escape liability even when the probability that they
wrongfully harmed the plaintiff (or are vicariously liable for the harm) is
greater than 50%, just because the plaintiff cannot identify what was
conduct simultaneous in time, or substantially so, and all of them have involved conduct of
substantially the same character, creating substantially the same risk of harm, on the part of
each actor. It is possible that cases may arise in which some modification of the rule stated
may be necessary because of complications arising from the fact that one of the actors
involved is not or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the effect of lapse of time,
or because of substantial differences in the character of the conduct of the actors or the risks
which they have created. Since such cases have not arisen, and the situations which might
arise are difficult to forecast, no attempt is made to deal with such problems in this Section.
The rule stated in Subsection (3) is not intended to preclude possible modification if such
situations call for it.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY, §
4 cmt. e (stating that the alternative liability doctrine is not available when the plaintiff
might have caused the accident).
17
More plausibly, liability could be derived from the exact probabilities of the injuries being
wrongfully caused by the hospital’s employees. Thus, if in Example I.3, the harm to the
plaintiff’s leg is 100 and to the plaintiff’s heart 500, liability should amount to 240: a 16%
chance that both harms (100+500) were wrongfully caused, a 24% chance that only the
harm to the leg (100) was wrongfully caused, and a 24% chance that only the harm to the
heart (500) was wrongfully caused. (16%*600 + 24%*100 + 24%*500 = 240).
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exactly the wrongful injurious behavior which caused his harm (Example
I.2), or what part of his harm is the result of that unidentified injurious
behavior (Example I.3).
So far aggregations would lead to more, rather than less liability. But
this is not always so. Thus, in Example I.3, with different numbers,
aggregation could lead to less, rather than more liability. To see why,
assume that the probability of the claims with respect to each doctor is 60%
instead of 40%. With no aggregation the hospital would be liable for both
injuries; with aggregation, the hospital will be liable for one injury only:
the probability that the claims against both doctors are correct is only 36%
(60% x 60%), and 36% is not enough to establish liability.
This brings us to the interesting conclusion that when aggregation
could lead to more, but also to less liability, and the injurer cannot know in
advance whether in his case aggregation would lead to either the one or the
other, aggregation would not necessarily change the injurer’s expected
liability and would not affect his behavior.
To illustrate, assume that in our example the hospital anticipates that
there could be two injuries where in each case the harm would be 100, and
the probability of each injury being caused by a doctor’s negligence would
be either 40% or 60% (with equal probabilities). With no aggregation the
hospital’s expected liability if the two allegations are made is 100: 50%
that the probability is 40% and then it pays zero, and 50% that the
probability is 60% and then it pays 200. But also with aggregation the
hospital’s expected liability is 100: 50% that the probability is 40% and
then it pays 100, and 50% that the probability is 60% and then it also pays
100 (since when there are two injuries and the probability is 60%, the
probability that the two injuries were caused by a doctor’s negligence is
only 36%). Once expected liability with or without aggregation is the same,
the parties’ incentives are the same as well.
Aggregation, however, would be of utmost importance for efficient
incentives if the injurer could know in advance that the typical probabilities
in his case would be lower than 50%. In the extreme case where the
probabilities are always lower than 50%, with no aggregation the injurer
never pays and is underdeterred, while with aggregation he pays sometimes
and is better deterred. Conversely, if the injurer could know in advance that
the typical probabilities in his case would be higher than 50%, a rule of no
aggregation could18 result in over-deterrence, because under the rule of no
aggregation the injurer’s expected liability would be higher than the
expected harm of his behavior. Aggregation would reduce expected
liability, making it closer to the expected harm and improving deterrence.
18

Under a negligence rule, over deterrence would not result when the standard of care was
set accurately, the injurer could observe it, and the court accurately enforced it, even if the
injurer pays damages higher than the harm caused by his negligence. See ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 218–9 (2012) (arguing that a small change in the
damages awarded to the victim will not cause the injurer's behavior to change).
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Lastly, there are cases where aggregation leads only to more liability,
and then no aggregation typically leads to underdeterrence. Thus, in
Examples I.1 (The Inherently Dangerous Vehicle) and I.2 (Injury in the
Hospital: Two Events, One Injury), there is only one injury, when each of
the two claims made by the plaintiff if properly established, justifies
liability. No aggregation would allow injurers to escape liability, even if the
probability that they wrongfully inflicted harm on the defendant is more
probable than not.
In all the examples discussed so far, aggregation of claims would not
be necessary if courts allowed probabilistic recoveries. Under a
probabilistic recovery rule (PRR) defendant’s liability is the amount of the
harm done to the plaintiff multiplied by the probability that the harm was
wrongfully caused by the defendant. Only some jurisdictions allow PRR,
and even when they allow it, the PRR applies in very limited contexts
(mostly in cases of lost chances of recovery19) and only when causation –
but not wrongfulness – is uncertain.20 It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the PRR. We draw a
preliminary and brief comparison between PRR and aggregation in the
footnote below.21
19
See e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 476–77 (Wash.
1983) (holding that a 14% reduction, from 39% to 25%, in the decedent’s chance for
survival was sufficient evidence to allow the case to go to the jury). Some courts have
adopted the lost chance doctrine only in cases of the victim’s demise, rejecting it in other
cases. See Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 57–58 (allowing probabilistic recovery only where the
ultimate harm to the victim is death). For straightforward support of applying a probabilistic
rule to lost chance of recovery cases, see Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). See also Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1206–07
(7th Cir. 1996). In Doll, Judge Posner supported extending the lost chance principle to areas
beyond medical malpractice. Specifically, he instructed the lower court to consider the
possibility of awarding the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit damages
calculated according to the chances that his not being promoted was due to illegal
discrimination.
20
See ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 57–83 (2001)
(discussing the pros and cons of probabilistic recoveries in different contexts, including
cases where wrongfulness is uncertain).
21
There are some clear limits to PRR compared to aggregation. First, when the remedy
cannot be prorated, as with injunctions, PRR is inapplicable, while aggregation applies to all
claims. Second, to apply PRR courts need accurate information about the probability that
the defendant wronged the plaintiff. That could often make adjudication costly, which is
probably one of the reasons why PRR is so rare in the law. This is not the case with
aggregation. With aggregation, courts do not need to calculate exact probabilities: they only
need to determine whether after aggregation it is more probable than not that the defendant
wronged the plaintiff (or that a defense applies), as they do also when there is only one
claim, and cross-claim factual aggregation is not done. Third, corrective justice theorists
resist PRR because PRR makes the defendant compensate the plaintiff even though it is not
more probable than not that he has wronged him. Other theorists not belonging to the
corrective justice school could also raise the concern that the machinery of the law should
not be put in motion against a defendant until it is more probable than not that the plaintiff is
entitled to a remedy. In contrast, with aggregation, the defendant pays damages (or is
subject to other remedies) only when it is more probable than not that he wronged the
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The last example in this section, which was first analyzed by Saul
Levmore,22 addresses a case where factual aggregation occurs within a
cause of action but across elements—which we will call cross-element
aggregation, and it typically23 leads to less rather than more liability.
Example I.4. Several Elements of One Cause of Action. Plaintiff argues that
defendant was negligent and that that negligence is the cause of his injury.
The probability that the plaintiff was negligent is 60% and the probability that
the plaintiff, given his negligence, caused the harm, is also 60%.

With no aggregation the court would find the defendant liable, and
with aggregation liability would not be imposed. Specifically, aggregation
would yield that the probability that the defendant negligently caused the
litigated harm is only 36%, and under the preponderance of the evidence
rule that probability is too low for imposing liability. Note that the
aggregation problem becomes more acute as the number of elements
composing the claim raises. Thus, if in addition to the uncertainty with
respect to negligence and causation there is also uncertainty with respect to
the plaintiff’s harm, so that each of the three elements is proven at
probability of 60%, aggregation would yield probability of 21.6% that the
defendant negligently caused the litigated harm. The law is not clear as to
whether jury and judges should engage in cross-element aggregation: in
several jurisdictions jury instructions encourage such aggregation, while in
other jurisdictions they discourage it.24
Throughout this section we have assumed that the probability of the
two (or more) claims being valid is independent, that is, if one claim is
valid, it does not affect the probability of the other claim being valid.
However, this assumption does not cover all cases. Sometimes there is
dependence between the probabilities, and then aggregation becomes more

plaintiff. Aggregation would therefore be easier to accept for many who resist PRR. See
discussion infra text accompanying note 122. There are also advantages to PRR over
aggregation. In particular, PRR works more systematically and accurately than aggregation,
because it is applied to each claim separately and calibrates damages accurately. Also,
possible strategic behavior by injurers trying to avoid future aggregation of low-probability
claims against them under aggregation rule would not take place under PRR.
22
Levmore, supra note 7, at 723, 725–8.
23
It would lead to more liability if some elements were alternatives to one another.
Levmore, id. at 726–9.
24
Levmore, id. at 752 n. 58 (arguing that no jurisdiction explicitly recognizes cross-element
aggregation), and at 725, 741 (arguing that jury instructions tend to be ambiguous in several
states, implicitly allowing such aggregation); Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a
Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (2001) (providing examples of jury instructions in several
jurisdictions that call for separate examination of the elements) ; Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A.
Jehl, Burdens of Persuasion in Civil Cases: Algorithms v. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 893 (2003) (arguing that the jury is never instructed to do what we call cross-element
aggregation).
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complex.25 Thus, if the defendant allegedly engaged in two separate
wrongful acts that caused two injuries (or injuries caused by two
individuals for whom the defendant is vicariously liable, as in Example I.3:
Injury in the Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries), the validity of the claim
that the defendant negligently caused the first injury could increase the
probability of the validity of the claim that the defendant negligently
caused the second injury, and vice versa. This complication, however, does
not preclude aggregation.
To illustrate, assume that claim A’s probability standing alone is 40%,
and claim B’s probability standing alone is also 40%, as in Example I.3.
Assume now that the probabilities of the two claims are dependent, and
because of that, the probability of each claim increases to 50%. With no
aggregation, both claims will be dismissed since a 50% probability is not
enough to establish liability. With aggregation, however, one claim would
be accepted, since the probability that at least one claim holds is greater
than 50%. Indeed, because the probabilities of the two claims are
dependent, the probability that at least one claim is valid is less than 75%,
which would have been the result of aggregation if both claims (with 50%
probability) had been independent. In the extreme case the dependence
between the probabilities of the two claims is full, which means that if
claim A is wrong, claim B also is wrong and vice versa. With full
dependence aggregation becomes meaningless, since the probability that
claim A (or claim B) holds is the same as the probability that at least one of
those claims holds.
B. Normative Aggregation and Mixed Aggregation
Consider the following example.
Example I.5. Insanity and Mitigation: Two “Almost Defenses.” Defendant hit
Plaintiff while driving his car at an unreasonable speed. Plaintiff was injured
and later chose not to undergo an essential surgery that would have cured him
completely. Plaintiff sues Defendant for negligently causing him the injury.
Defendant raises two defenses: insanity on his part and failure to mitigate
damages on Plaintiff’s part. The court concludes that even though Defendant
suffered from severe mental instability at the time of the accident his mental
capacity had not been diminished to the point where the insanity defense
applies.26 The court also concludes that even though the plaintiff’s failure to
25
Levmore, supra note 7, at 726–8 (discussing the dependence problem mainly in cases
represented by our Example I.4).
26
The insanity defense is quite limited under American tort law: See DOBBS, supra note 8,
at §120 (stating that the general rule is that the mentally disabled are liable for negligence,
but a few exceptions exist: if the act was committed as a result of a sudden onset of
unforeseeable insanity, or the insanity was caused by the defendant’s effort to protect the
plaintiff, or the plaintiff's job involved working with mentally disabled, some jurisdictions
will not impose liability); Breuning v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (Wis.
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undergo the surgery was unreasonable for most people, the mitigation of
damages defense does not apply, since tort law tolerates people’s resistance to
undergoing surgery.27

The court deciding the case would not aggregate the two defenses
raised by the defendant, and would reject both of them.28 We might
criticize this stance by pointing out that a defendant with both “almost
defenses” may seem less blameworthy than a defendant with only one. In a
metaphoric way we could say that to justify a defense the defendant should
reach a point of normative weight denoted as a. That point can be reached
if one of the two defenses applies (thus, each defense provides the
normative weight of a), but also by the accumulative normative weight of
two “almost defenses” (assuming, for example, that the normative weight
of each of the “almost defenses” is ½ a or more). Consider this argument
from an economic perspective. We do not impose liability on mentally
incompetent people because they are undeterrable, and we deny damages to
plaintiffs who fail to mitigate in order to give them an incentive to mitigate.
But we may want to deny damages where the barely mentally competent
person will be only barely responsive to them and the surgery-fearing
victim will be somewhat responsive to the absence of them—because their
joint response may well be optimal if damages are not awarded. At the
margin, the driver’s incentives will be less affected if damages are
awarded, than the victim’s incentives if damages are denied.
A solution is to aggregate the two “almost defenses” and release the
defendant from liability for the harms that would have been avoided if the
plaintiff had undergone the surgery. By doing so the court would
acknowledge that even if none of the defenses standing alone should apply,
the accumulative weight of the two “almost defenses” is sufficient for
justifying a defense.
As we have said, courts would probably not allow aggregation in
example I.5, but maybe would be more attentive to aggregation arguments
when facing two defense arguments based on similar normative grounds, or
when the defenses interrelate with each other. Thus, if a defendant raises

1970) (deciding that when a person commits an act as a result of a sudden onset of
unforeseeable insanity, liability will not be imposed).
27
See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS 448 (1999) (discussing the dilemma of whether refusing to
undergo a surgery with a positive expected benefit would necessarily infringe the mitigation
of damages principle).
28
In Boa v. San Francisco-Oakland T. Rys, 187 P. 2 (Cal. 1920), the plaintiff sustained
physical injury when she exited from the defendant’s street car. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that she failed to mitigate damages by
choosing an improper physician. The trial court instructed the jury that if they found the
plaintiff’s contributory negligence to be 50% or less, they should not allow the contributory
negligence defense. The jury denied both defenses. Had the court instructed the jury to
aggregate the claims, either factually or normatively, the jury might have reached a different
decision.
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the defenses of self-defense and insanity, arguing that the somewhat
excessive force she used to defend herself is related to her deficient mental
capacity at the time of the injury, maybe the justification to aggregate the
two “almost defenses” would make more sense to some courts.29
However, courts should be cautious with cross-claim normative
aggregation, because the weight of “almost” defense, or “almost” claim
could be zero, and then there would be nothing to aggregate. For example,
suppose a driver hits a pedestrian and then subsequently crashes into the
pedestrian’s house. A court holds that each act was almost negligent but not
quite negligent—in both cases, the cost of precaution would have been
(barely) more than the expected harm. When the claims are aggregated, it
remains the case that defendant should not be held negligent—because the
joint cost of precaution would have been greater than the joint expected
harm.
That conclusion might change, if we adopted a different theory for
negligence. If, for example, we believe that there is some moral blame in
causing harm even if non-negligently, but that the level of blame by itself is
not enough to justify the law’s intervention, then we might believe that that
latter conclusion should change once there is more than one injury caused
by the same defendant to the same plaintiff (or maybe even to different
plaintiffs). From such a theory of torts, one could develop a possible
justification for strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities: even if an
injurer’s activity is efficient, the high intensity of creating risks to victims
is the justification for imposing liability on him.30
An example where we believe that cross-claim normative aggregation
could explain a puzzling legal rule in tort law, is the rule that one has a duty
to rescue another person under the common law, if that person was the one
who created the risk (even not negligently) to the person needing the
rescue. Thus, a person who non-negligently shot her gun in the forest and
hit the plaintiff causing him to fall into a pool of water, must take
reasonable measures to rescue him, although other people do not have such
a duty.31 Tort theorists struggled with the question of what the justification
29
In a criminal context, see State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132 (Md. App. 2004) (The
defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree of her husband. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the trial court erred when it rejected both her self-defense and insanity
arguments. She argued that since she was a battered wife, she used excessive force
defending herself, but the excessiveness of the force itself was the result of insanity, since
she suffered from “battered spouse syndrome.” The court accepted the validity of her
arguments and ordered new trial).
30
Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 311 (1996) (arguing that when risks are high, prevention is justified, even if costbenefit analysis yields that it is not); Gregory Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in
the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193 (2000) (same).
31
See EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 291 (giving an example of a car that blocks the highway
without fault, and explaining that the driver still has the responsibility to warn other drivers
of the danger); DOBBS, supra note 8, at §316 (arguing that an exception to the no duty to
rescue principle applies when the defendant who failed to rescue caused the harm or created
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for such a rule is, given that both non-negligently causing harm and nonrescue do not give rise to tort liability. Isn’t it that nil plus nil is still nil?32
A possible explanation is that tort law aggregates two claims, each of
which has some normative weight but neither of which is alone sufficient
to justify liability, so that once those two claims are aggregated, liability is
justified. In particular, non-negligently causing harm is not sufficient to
justify liability, and a failing to rescue is not sufficient to justify liability,
but non-negligently causing harm followed by a failure to rescue may
nevertheless justify liability.33
If cross-claim factual aggregations and cross-claim normative
aggregations were recognized, the door would be open for mixed
aggregations. The next example, which is a variation of Example I.5,
illustrates the potential for mixed aggregations.
Example I.6. Insanity and Mitigation: an Uncertain Defense with a Certain
“Almost Defense”. Same facts as in Example I.5, except that there is factual
uncertainty as to the application of the insanity defense, so that the
probability that that defense applies is 40%. If, however, the uncertain facts
reflected reality, the defense would clearly apply.

With no aggregation the court would reject the insanity defense in
Example I.6 since the defendant failed to establish that defense by the
preponderance of the evidence. The court will also reject the mitigation of
damages defense, since the failure of the plaintiff to undergo surgery, even
if considered by most people unreasonable, does not trigger the application
of the defense.34 Conversely, with aggregation the court would recognize a
a risk to the plaintiff, even if innocently and without fault); Maladona v. Southem Pac.
Trans. Co., 629 P.2d 1001 (Ariz. App. 1981) (deciding that when the defendant creates the
danger, even if with no fault, he has a duty to rescue even if the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent).
32
See Richard A. Epstein, Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 193 (1973)
(noting this problem and arguing that judges dislike the outcome of no liability in such
cases, which explains this otherwise unexplained exception to the no duty to rescue rule.
Following Epstein's logic, one could make the argument that the creation of the exception is
the result of implicit normative aggregation).
33
This is not the only possible explanation, of course. See EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 291
(arguing that in cases where the defendant caused the injury with no fault, it becomes easier
to identify the one who could have rescued the plaintiff); Ernest J. Weinrib, A Call for the
Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L. J. 247, 257–8 (1981) (asserting that the increase in the
probability of an accident diminishes the ability of the victim and others to abate it, and
therefore the defendant has a duty to act); William Lands & Richard Posner, Salvors,
Finders, Good Samaritans and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7
J. LEGAL. STUD. 83, 125–6 (1978) (arguing that when the risk is increased by the actor, the
risk of error in establishing causation between the omission and the injury is reduced).
34
In Davenport v. F.B. Dubach Lumber Co. 36 So. 812 (La. 1904), the plaintiff, the
defendant’s employee, was run over by a locomotive and sustained severe injuries. The
defendant argued in its defense that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that while
being hospitalized he signed a compromise agreement with the defendant, releasing it from
liability. The plaintiff argued that he was not contributorily negligent and that when he
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defense for the plaintiff and would exonerate her from liability from the
harm she could have mitigated if she had undergone the surgery.35
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
Should tort law allow cross-persons aggregations? Take the following
example:
Example I.7: Mass Torts: Indeterminate Plaintiffs. Defendant’s factory
wrongfully emits radiation which caused an increase in the frequency of a
fatal cancer in the population; instead of 100 people contracting the disease
every year, now 125 people contracting it every year. Due to lack of scientific
knowledge it is impossible to identify who are those 25 victims whose
disease was caused by the radiation. All 125 people bring suits against
Defendant.36

Under traditional causation principles all suits would be dismissed
because none of the plaintiffs can establish by the preponderance of the
evidence her claim that her disease was caused by the defendant’s
wrongdoing. The plaintiffs can establish, however, that the wrongdoing
caused harm to 25 out of the 125 plaintiffs. By aggregating all claims, the
court would impose liability on defendant for 20% of the total harm
suffered by all plaintiffs and would distribute the damages among them (in
equal shares, if all suffer the same harm).
Notice that the aggregation of all claims in Example I.7 mimics
defendant’s liability if there was no uncertainty, but does not mimic
plaintiffs’ entitlements if there was no uncertainty. Without uncertainty
defendant would probably have paid about 20% of the total harm as he also
does under uncertainty, but damages go to 25, rather than 125 plaintiffs.
Thus, one could say that the aggregation works on defendant’s rather than
signed the compromise agreement he was under the influence of drugs. The court denied the
defenses and decided for the plaintiff. From the facts in the court decision it seems that there
was some factual uncertainty as to the applicability of the contributory negligence defense.
If the defense relating to the release agreement was “almost” applicable, a mixed
aggregation could have brought the court to a different decision.
35
As with factual aggregation, the probabilistic recovery rule could be applied in normative
aggregation cases, making aggregation unnecessary. But as we have explained, there are
several clear advantages to aggregation over the probabilistic recovery rule: see supra note
21 and accompanying text. For a recent discussion of the related topic of the either/or
character of the law, see Leo Katz, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 139–81 (2011), who also
cites the main sources in the literature.
36
For a well-known case presenting the same problem, and in which a settlement was
reached, see In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), aff’d, 818 F. 2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (Suits brought by veterans against manufacturers
of “Agent Orange” for injuries allegedly caused by their exposure to that chemical, which
was used by US military forces in the Vietnam War. Many of the plaintiffs’ injuries could
have equally been attributed to either their pre-existing conditions or to the exposure to
Agent Orange).
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the individual plaintiffs’ side.
Market Share Liability is an example of aggregating on both
defendants’ and plaintiffs’ sides, and therefore mimics both defendants’
liability and plaintiffs’ entitlements if there was no uncertainty. Thus, in the
notorious DES cases, numerous manufacturers produced the same generic
drug for preventing miscarriage, which, many years later, was proven to be
defective and harmful to the daughters of the women who had taken the
drug.37 Plaintiffs, however, found it impossible to prove the identity of the
specific manufacturer that had produced the specific drug taken by their
mothers many years earlier.38 For some time, courts refused to impose
liability on manufacturers, since the probability that a specific
manufacturer had actually caused the litigated harm in any given case was
much lower than 50%.39 In 1980, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the
California Supreme Court established the Market Share Liability doctrine,
whereby all manufacturers are liable toward plaintiffs in accordance with
their market share.40 Under market share liability, when all suits are
completed, manufacturers bear liability in the amount of the actual harm
they wrongfully caused and plaintiffs receive damages in the amount of the
harms they suffered from wrongdoing. Thus market share liability aims at
mimicking the world without uncertainty, and aggregation works on both
defendants’ and plaintiffs’ sides.
So far we illustrated cross-person aggregation under uncertainty.
Thus, the cross-person aggregation discussed so far is an extension of the
cross-claim factual aggregation discussed in section A above. But crossperson aggregation can extend the cross-claim normative aggregation and
cross-claim mixed aggregation discussed in section B above.
In U.S. v. Hatahley,41 Native Americans brought suit against the US
government for trespass, arguing that their horses and burros were
unlawfully rounded up by the government’s agents and later sold to a
horse-meat plant and a glue factory. Among other things, they sued for
mental pain and suffering. The district court awarded them damages for
mental pain and suffering under a theory that the emotional harm they
suffered was “a community loss and a community sorrow shared by all.”42

37

Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (establishing the Market Share Liability
doctrine and elaborating on its advantages).
38
Id. at 928.
39
See, e.g., McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 732–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(denying liability of DES producers and ruling that recovery for injuries resulting from a
defective product requires that the plaintiff identify the manufacturer and establish the
causal relation between the injury and the product).
40
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937–38.
41
257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958).
42
“It is not possible for the extent of the mental pain and suffering to be separately
evaluated as to each individual plaintiff. It is evident that each and all of the plaintiffs
sustained mental pain and suffering. Nor is it possible to say that the plaintiff who lost one
or two horses sustained less mental pain and suffering than plaintiffs who lost a dozen
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That theory allowed the court to be generous to the plaintiffs and award
them relatively high amount of damages. The Court of Appeals rejected the
District Court’s theory, maintaining that “pain and suffering is a personal
and individual matter, not a common injury, and must so be treated”.43
Using our terminology, the district court allowed a kind cross-person
normative aggregation, perhaps under the assumption that the aggregate
harm across persons exceeded a normative threshold even if the harm
caused to any particular person did not.44

II. CONTRACT LAW
A. Factual Aggregation
Like tort law, contract law permits factual aggregation within claims,45
but does not generally permit cross-claim factual aggregation.
Example II.1. Either Material Breach or Fraudulent Misrepresentation.
Plaintiff can prove with 40 percent probability that defendant engaged in a
material breach of a contract, and also can prove with 40 percent probability
that defendant engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation. Under either theory,
plaintiff would be entitled to rescission of the contract.

Although the probability that one claim or the other is valid is 64
percent, plaintiff would lose, because courts do not permit cross-claim
factual aggregation.46
Long-term contracts or business relationships involving multiple
contracts can raise issues of cross-claim factual aggregation. Thus, buyer
could bring a suit against seller arguing that seller breached the same
contract several times in the past, or breached several contracts in the past,
horses. It was a community loss and a community sorrow shared by all.” Id. at 17.
43
The court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial as to damages. Id. at 15.
44
Alternatively, maybe the district court thought that the cross-person aggregation allowed
the award of higher total damages than the total damages that would have been awarded if
damages for the emotional pain and suffering had been calculated for each plaintiff in
isolation.
45
See e.g., Photovest Corporation v. Fotomat Corporation, 606 F.2d 704, 727–30 (7th Cir.
1979) (holding that multiple breaches by a franchisor amounted to a violation of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and even a possible tort claim justifying punitive
damages under Indiana law). However, it is not clear whether the individual allegations
were below the preponderance of the evidence standard and were aggregated, or were each
above the preponderance of the evidence standard. If the latter is right, than it is an example
of a normative aggregation.
46
See, e.g., Zytax, Inc. v. Green Plains Renewable Energy, Inc., No. H-09-2582, 2010 WL
4702303 (S.D.Tex. Nov. 10, 2010), where the defendant tried to avoid a contract by alleging
fraudulent misrepresentation, material breach, and mutual mistake, all in the alternative. The
court dismissed each claim separately and did not treat them in the aggregate.
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and therefore is entitled to compensation. Buyer may fail, however, to
prove any specific breach by the preponderance of the evidence, so the
court will dismiss the suit. By contrast, aggregation would lead the court to
award damages for one or some of the alleged breaches, or, in the
appropriate cases, to confirm that buyer’s refusal to offer payments for
performance was justified in one, or more, of the alleged breaches. Indeed,
the court would not be able to point out the exact breach that took place,
and therefore the court would have to craft a remedy that averages the
alleged breaches. If the alleged breaches are similar (say, five deliveries of
the same amount of widgets, with similar allegations of breach),
aggregation would be relatively easy. Otherwise, aggregation would be
more complex and one could argue that aggregation should not be made.
But even if averaging the remedy is complex, at a minimum the court
should acknowledge that the least severe breach took place and allow a
remedy for it.
It is possible that courts in fact make such aggregations without
admitting it. Moreover, sometimes there is dependence between the alleged
breaches, so that one alleged breach, even if not proven by the
preponderance of the evidence, could serve as evidence to establish other
breaches.47 Thus, similar to the criminal law doctrines of prior acts and
similar crimes,48 one alleged breach could enhance the probability that
another alleged breach took place.
Parties to contracts, unlike tort victims and wrongdoers, can address
aggregation directly by providing in their contracts that the court should
aggregate facts. As far as we are aware, they do not.49 This raises the
question whether cross-claim factual aggregation is actually a desirable
approach. It may be that parties do not provide for cross-claim factual
aggregation because it would not improve incentives. Although cross-claim
factual aggregation leads to more accurate decisions ex post, it does not
improve incentives because the too-high and too-low outcomes cancel out
ex ante.
To illustrate, assume that the parties anticipate, when making their
contract, that there could be two allegations of two separate breaches by the
promisee, where in each case the harm would be 100 and the probability of
each breach would be either 40% or 60% (with equal probabilities). With
no aggregation the promisor’s expected liability if the two allegations are

47

See Igen-International v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH, 335 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 2003)
(affirming the jury’s aggregation of several minor breaches to form a material breach).
48
See infra text accompanying notes 67–77.
49
At least not explicitly. It is possible, however, that parties do open the door for
aggregation in more subtle ways. For instance, contracts often call for cooperation, best
efforts, good faith, etc. They also often create mechanisms for the resolution of
disagreements by non-lawyer arbiters who need not provide rigorous and formal reasoning
for their decisions. Those standards and mechanisms could be used for implicit
aggregations.
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made is 100: 50% that the probability is 40% and then he pays zero, and
50% that the probability is 60% and then he pays 200. But also with
aggregation the promisor’s expected liability is 100: 50% that the
probability is 40% and then he pays 100, and 50% that the probability is
60% and then he also pays 100 (since when there are two breaches and the
probability is 60%, the probability that the two breaches took place is only
36%). Once expected liability with or without aggregation is the same, the
parties’ incentives are the same as well.
If, however, the remedy the parties to the contract anticipate is
rescission, and the two alleged breaches are material (or there are an
alleged material breach and an alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, as in
Example II.1), aggregation would always increase the promisor’s ability to
rescind the contract. That would generally improve the parties’ incentives,
because the promisee would be able to rescind the contract whenever it is
more probable than not that the promisor materially breached it (or, in
Example II.1. either materially breached the contract or engaged in
fraudulent misrepresentation or did both).
B. Normative Aggregation
Contract law does not directly permit cross-claim normative
aggregation of the following type.
Example
II.2.
Non-Material
Breach
and
Minor
Fraudulent
Misrepresentation. Defendant engages in a minor form of fraudulent
misrepresentation in order to secure plaintiff’s consent to a contract;
subsequently, defendant engages in a breach that falls just short of material.
Plaintiff seeks to rescind the contract based on both fraudulent
misrepresentation and breach.

A court would typically not approve the rescission in Example II.2.50
Plaintiff would lose the first claim because the fraud would be deemed
mere puffery, and on the second claim because the breach is not material.
Therefore, the court would decide that the plaintiff, by unlawfully
rescinding the contract, breached the contract himself. By contrast,
aggregation would permit the plaintiff to claim that he was entitled to
rescind the contract on the basis of both the fraudulent misrepresentation
and the breach, even though none of them standing alone was sufficient for
rescission.
Yet aggregation may be permitted when within a claim.
50

At least not expressly. Courts sometimes permit considerations from one claim (or
defense) to bleed over to another. For example, in Lincoln Ben Life Co. v. Edwards, 45
F.Supp.2d 722 (D. Neb. 1999), a court found that the plaintiff had entered into a contract
under duress in part because the defendant had also committed fraud by lying about the
contents of the contract.
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Example II.3. Two minor breaches. Defendant promises to build a house for
plaintiff. When the time for the first progress payment comes round,
defendant is a little behind in schedule and has made some minor mistakes in
construction.

Even though each of the two breaches might not be regarded as
substantial individually, a court could find them collectively substantial,
justifying rescission on the part of plaintiff.51
Consider another example, which shows the evolution of the law to
address aggregation problems.
Example II.4. Unconscionability. A store sells a TV set on credit to a poor
customer. The customer is not well educated and does not read the contract,
which provides that the store may repossess all of the goods that the customer
bought previously from the store on credit if they are not yet fully paid for
and customer defaults on payments for the TV set.

Under older doctrine, the customer would not have a remedy. If she
sued under the mistake doctrine, she would lose because she did not read
the contract. If she sued on the grounds that she was uneducated, she would
lose because although courts recognize incompetence or undue influence as
grounds for rescission, they treat lack of education as falling short of
incompetence or undue influence.52 But over the last half century, the
doctrine of unconscionability evolved.53 Under this doctrine, plaintiff can
jointly invoke considerations—mistake, lack of education—that can be
considered only individually under other doctrines. In this way, the
unconscionability doctrine can be understood as permitting a kind of
51

See Seven-Up Bottling Co. (Bangkok) v. PepsiCo Inc, 686 F.Supp 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(multiple breaches by bottler; similar analysis); SunTrust Mortg., Inc. v. United Guar.
Residential Ins. Co., No. 3:09cv529, 2011 WL 3664749 (E.D.Va. Aug. 19, 2011) (holding
that multiple small breaches added up to material breach justifying rescission); Clarendon
America Ins. Co. v. General Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. App.
2011) (allowing the insurer not to pay the contractor for property damages, probably
because of the cumulative weight of two defaults of the insured under the policy).
52
Mason v. Acceptance Loan Co., 850 So. 2d 289 (Ala. 2002) (stating that lack of education
does not deprive one of the ability to contract, and that not reading the contract, in the
absence of fraud, is not a reason to avoid the contract).
53
See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. 1965) (recognizing
unconscionability to include an absence of meaningful choice, caused by the inequality of
bargaining power when one of the parties is uneducated and signed the contract without full
knowledge of its terms); UCC §2-302(1) (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result.”); see JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 151–177 (2000) (discussing the unconscionability doctrine); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 908 (1999) (same).
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aggregation. But it is important to see that the aggregation is indirect: the
court does not say that plaintiff can prevail by presenting colorable claims
under two doctrines; instead, it creates a new doctrine that has the same
effect.54
As this example shows, courts may address concerns about
aggregation through doctrinal evolution. Broader standards subsume
narrower rules as courts realize that cases can fall between the rules while
reflecting the concerns that justify those rules. But as the doctrine becomes
broader and permits greater aggregation, critics complain that the law
becomes too vague and can no longer guide behavior.55 We will return to
this problem in Part V.
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
As with torts also with contracts there are cases where plaintiffs
cannot prevail against a specific defendant because of inherent difficulties
of proof and then a question could arise whether cross-person aggregation
should be allowed. The next example illustrates such cases.
Example II.5. Many Unproven Breaches with Customers. Defendant ships
goods by sea, and plaintiffs are defendant’s customers whose goods were
damaged. In most cases there is evidence indicating that the damage could be
the result of a breach of contract by defendant, but that evidence is not strong
enough to establish liability.

The court in Example II.5 would reject all suits because in none of
them the plaintiff can establish liability. Prevailing law would also not
allow recovery even if plaintiffs brought a class action, since in order to
succeed in a class action plaintiffs must show that they would have
succeeded in trial if they had brought their claims separately.
That result would change if courts were willing to aggregate all claims
and allow full recovery in some of the cases, or partial (probabilistic)
recovery in all of the cases. We speculate that the argument for aggregation
would seem more compelling for courts if a breach was established by the
preponderance of the evidence and only causation could not be proven,
than if the breach itself cannot be proven. By analogy from tort law, when
the wrongdoing is proven but causation is uncertain the law is more lenient

54

A similar point can be made about Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533
(Cal. App. 1996), where fraud, duress, and similar claims were rejected, but an undue
influence claim which took into account factors relevant to the other claims was accepted.
55
For this criticism of the unconscionability doctrine, see, e.g., Evelyn L. Brown,
Uncertainty of U.C.C. Section 2-302: Why Unconscionability Has Become a Relic, 105
COM. L. J. 287, 288 (2000) (arguing that the unconscionability doctrine allowed courts wide
latitude in its use as well as manipulation of the term, and increased the potential for
arbitrary decisions).
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to plaintiffs, than if the wrongdoing itself cannot be proven.56
III. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Factual Aggregation
Aggregation in criminal law resembles aggregation in tort law but
raises special concerns because of sensitivities about the rights of the
accused.57 Consider the following example:
Example III.1: Two Unproven Charges. The Defendant is charged with
pickpocketing and rape, two unrelated offenses allegedly committed by him
at different times and places. The evidence suggests that the probability that
he committed each one of these offenses is 90%. Assume that the required
probability necessary to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is
95%.58

Under prevailing law the defendant would be acquitted of both
offenses. Yet, there is a 99% probability59 that he committed at least one
offense, which is higher than the 95% probability necessary for conviction
in a criminal trial. If instead the court engaged in cross-claim factual
aggregation, it would convict the defendant of one unspecified offense and
impose on him at a minimum the sanction of the less severe of the two
offenses, that is, pickpocketing. Example III.1 raises a straightforward
dilemma: Individuals are routinely convicted for committing a single
offense on the basis of evidence that establishes guilt with a lower
probability (95% under our assumption) than the probability that the
defendant in Example III.1 committed at least one offense (99%).
Arguably, it is not just that the Example III.1 defendant is acquitted while,
at the same time, a defendant charged with a single offense that can be
proven at a lower probability (95% under our initial assumption) is
convicted.
Example III.1 illustrates how cross-claim factual aggregation can
result in more convictions than with no aggregation. But aggregation can
also result in fewer convictions, as is illustrated in Example III.2.
Example III.2: Two Proven Charges. The Defendant is charged with
56

See discussion supra text accompanying notes 12–14.
See Harel & Porat, supra note 7 (discussing factual aggregation in criminal law).
58
This example is borrowed from Harel & Porat, id., at 262.
59
The probability that the defendant committed each one of the offenses is .9, and therefore
the probability, for each one, that he did not commit the offense is 1-.9 =.1. Consequently,
the probability that he did not commit any offense is (.1)2=.01, and the probability that he
committed at least one of the offenses is 1-.01 = .99.
57
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pickpocketing and rape, two unrelated offenses, allegedly committed by him
in different times and places. The evidence suggests that the probability that
he committed any one of these offenses is 95%. Assume that the required
probability necessary to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is
95%.

Under prevailing law the defendant would be convicted on both
charges because the probability that he committed each of the offenses
(95%) is sufficient for conviction. Yet, the probability that the defendant
committed both offenses is only 90%, which is lower than 95%.60
Therefore, with cross-claim factual aggregation, the court would convict
the defendant of only one offense: while the probability that he committed
at least one offense is greater than 95% (it is 99.75%) which is sufficient
for conviction, the probability that he committed two offenses is lower than
95% which is insufficient for conviction. The court would need to decide
which of the two offenses to convict the defendant of; the correct decision
is to convict the defendant only of the most severe offense since the
probability that he committed that offense is 95%.61 Put differently, the
probability that the defendant deserves the combined sentence for both
offenses is less than 95%, but the probability that he deserves the sentence
for the more severe offense is higher than 95%. However, it could well be
appropriate for the court to nudge the sentence up a bit to reflect the fact
that there is a 90% probability that the defendant committed both offenses.
Cross-claim factual aggregation in cases illustrated by Example III.1
would improve deterrence (assuming, as we must, that the beyond-thereasonable-doubt standard should be taken as fixed). Under current law,
defendants who are charged with several offenses and the probability of
their guilt is very high often escape conviction just because no specified
offense can be attributed to them. Those defendants are underdeterred
under current law, and will be better deterred with cross-claim factual
aggregation. In contrast, cross-claim factual aggregation in cases illustrated
by Example III.2 would reduce wrongful convictions. Under current law
defendants who are charged with several offenses are often convicted of
those offenses, even if the probability that they committed all those
offenses is too low. With cross-claim factual aggregation those defendants
will be convicted of fewer offenses and many wrong convictions will be
avoided.62

60

(.95)2 = .9025.
Cross-claim factual aggregation could apply also to defense claims. In Ralston v. State,
No. 49A02-0909-CR-929, LEXIS 693 (Ind. App. May 26, 2010), the defendant raised two
defense claims: that he did not cause the victim’s death and that he acted in self-defense
when he repeatedly punched the victim. Both claims were considered separately by the jury
and denied. Aggregating the two claims might have brought a different result.
62
Under certain conditions, reducing the number of wrong convictions by increasing the
burden of proof – the result of aggregation in cases illustrated by example III.2 – increases
61
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Cross-claim factual aggregation in criminal law might be regarded as
more objectionable than in torts and contracts, because of the concern that
it would curtail the accused’s rights. Allowing aggregation would require
changes in procedure that many would consider undesirable. In particular,
aggregation would require that the prosecution be allowed to bring several
charges of different nature against the accused at the same trial, since it is
hard to imagine that aggregation would take place when each charge is
brought before a different jury or judge.63 Aggregation could increase the
burden on the defense, since defending against several charges, even if
each has a low probability, could be harder and more costly than defending
against one high-probability charge. Aggregation could also encourage
abuse and strategic behavior by the prosecution because it is typically
easier – maybe too easy – to bring many low probability charges against
the defendant than to bring one high probability charge against him.
However, from a different perspective the lower costs of bringing several
low-probability charges indicate an advantage of aggregation: it
economizes on enforcement costs. Finally, a more substantive objection to
aggregation could be that it would dilute the expressive function of
criminal law: thus in Example III.1, with aggregation, the accused would
be convicted of being either a rapist or a pickpocket—so his criminal
record would literally list his offense as “rape or larceny”—and some
would consider that intolerable, although it is hard to imagine why acquittal
of both crimes would be preferable.64
Cross-element aggregation is also an issue in criminal law.65 If several
elements of the same offense must be proven to establish the defendant’s
guilt, then cross-element aggregation generates a different outcome than if
each element is considered separately. For instance, if convicting a person
for burglary requires both trespass and intent to commit a crime, it is
possible that even if each element of the offense (trespass and intent) can
deterrence since it increases the difference between the expected sanction of the guilty and
innocent. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1276 (2001) (arguing that if bad character evidence were admitted at
the conviction stage, the disincentive for engaging in crime would be weakened, since
character evidence enhances the probability of conviction, both for those who committed the
prescribed acts and for those who refrained from such behavior, leading to a decrease in the
marginal cost of engaging in the criminal activity ex ante).
63
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that two offenses may be
joined in the same indictment if they “are of the same or similar character, or are based on
the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or
plan.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 8. Under Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
courts may order separate trials if the joinder of offenses appears to prejudice a defendant or
the government. Id. 14(a).
64
For more objections and responses see Harel & Porat, supra note 7, at 291–309.
65
See Maya Bar-Hillel, Probabalistic Analysis in Legal Factfinding, 56 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 268–70, 282–83 (1984) (analyzing the use of probabilities in cases and
suggesting a “soft role… for probability in the factfinding process”). But see People v.
Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 33, 40 (Cal. 1968) (rejecting the use of probabilities in determining
guilt on the facts of this case).
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be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, reasonable doubt could still exist
with respect to the cumulative presence of the two elements. Will the court
convict the defendant under such circumstances? The answer is unclear.66
Cross-claim factual aggregation should be distinguished from two
existing doctrines in criminal law: the prior-acts and similar-crimes
doctrines.67 Under both of these doctrines, past similar behavior on the part
of the defendant can be used as evidence supporting conviction.68 But these
two doctrines, termed the “pattern-of-behavior doctrines,” are distinct from
the aggregation discussed above. Whereas the pattern-of-behavior doctrines
are based on the probabilistic dependence of the offenses attributed to the
defendant, the aggregation we have discussed is most appropriately (but not
only) applied when those offenses are entirely independent of one another.
Under the prior-acts doctrine, which was adopted in Rule 404(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence,69 the prosecution can bring evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts that can be attributed to the defendant to
establish motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.70 This evidence cannot be used
to prove the defendant’s bad character and courts are required to instruct
the jury accordingly.71 Interestingly, under Rule 404(b), as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, even conduct that has been the subject of a prior
acquittal can be submitted as evidence by the prosecution in a subsequent

66
Cf. Levmore, supra note 7, at 733 n.19 (suggesting that the defense might benefit from a
rule of aggregation when it reminds the jury of all the doubts that have been raised and
implies that, combined, they create more than a reasonable doubt), with Jonathan Remy
Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 75, 138 (2003) (discussing the rule of aggregation in the context of voting by judges in
a panel or by jurors and observing that “[a]lthough a criminal defendant cannot be convicted
unless a jury unanimously finds each element of the crime charged proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, ‘a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several
possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several
possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime’” (citation omitted)).
Note that the Model Penal Code section 1.12(1) says that “[n]o person may be convicted of
an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” It
seems that the code rules out cross-element aggregation.
67
See FED. R. EVID. 403, 413, 414.
68
Id.
69
See id. 404(b). See also United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 137 (4th Cir. 1973), where
the court stated prior to the enactment of Rule 404(b): “Unlike other cases where evidence
of prior crimes is admissible for only limited purposes and where it is necessary or proper to
give limiting instructions, evidence of the prior events was admissible here to prove both
that Paul was the victim of infanticide and that defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.”
70
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
71
See People v. Quinn, 486 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (“Where, however,
evidence of a defendant’s other wrongful acts has been admitted for the limited purposes
allowed under MRE 404(b), the prosecutor deprives the defendant of a fair trial in arguing
that the jury should consider the evidence as substantive evidence of the defendant’s
guilt.”); see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689–92 (1988) (holding that the
trial court is not required to make a preliminary finding that the petitioner proved
commission of the similar acts by a preponderance of the evidence).
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trial in order to support conviction.72
The similar-crimes doctrine, adopted in Rules 413 and 414 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, applies to sexual assault and child molestation
offenses.73 Under this doctrine, if the defendant is accused of one of these
types of offenses, “evidence of the defendant’s commission of another
offense or offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible, and
may be considered for its bearing on any other matter to which it is
relevant.”74
The superficial similarity between the pattern-of-behavior doctrines
and the aggregation discussed by us stems from their shared feature,
namely that all three consider the past behavior of the defendant and affirm
that past behavior influences the likelihood of conviction.75 But, this
resemblance notwithstanding, there is a substantial difference between
them. The pattern-of-behavior doctrines are rooted in the premise that a
person who has committed several offenses in the past is more likely to
either have intended or have actually committed the offense of which that
person is presently accused. The defendant’s past behavior thus modifies
the probability of his guilt in the current case. It is the dependence between
the past offense and the present alleged offense that provides the grounds
for conviction.76 In contrast, the cross-claim factual aggregation discussed
by us is simply based on the truism that the probability that a person
committed at least one of two offenses (A or B) is greater than the
probability that she committed A and greater than the probability that she
committed B (unless there is full dependence between the two offenses).
The cross-claim factual aggregation is not based on any dependence
between the offenses attributed to the defendant: the probability that she
committed one offense does not change the probability that she committed
another. Rather, only the probability that she committed an unspecified
offense is affected.77
72

See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1990) (holding that testimony
tending to prove that the defendant had committed a crime, which had been brought in a
prior trial that ended in acquittal, was rightly admitted under Rule 404(b) by the court in a
subsequent trial because it established the defendant's identity).
73
FED. R. EVID. 413, 414.
74
Id. Under Rule 415 of the Federal Rules of Evidence this doctrine is also applicable to
civil cases involving sexual assault and child molestation. See Louis M. Natali Jr. & R.
Stephen Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity
Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 29 (1997) ("By requiring
the admission of propensity evidence, the rules prevent a fundamentally fair trial, and thus
violate due process…”).
75
As Example III.2 illustrates, sometimes aggregation leads to acquittal rather than to
conviction.
76
In probability theory, two events are dependent if the probability of one is a function of
the occurrence of the other; otherwise, they are independent.
77
Note that under the prior-acts and similar-crimes doctrines, the fact that a person
committed several similar offenses in the past increases the chances of conviction in the
present case. Under cross-claim factual aggregation, in contrast, as illustrated by Example
III.2, the fact that a person was convicted of several offenses in the past decreases the
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B. Normative Aggregation
Normative aggregation could arise in criminal law in situations
analogous to tort law. Thus, like the tort defendant, the criminal defendant
may raise two defenses, neither of them sufficient for exonerating the
defendant from liability; but the weight of the two “almost” defenses taken
together may be sufficient for acquittal. For example, the defendant may
raise a factual mistake defense and self-defense. Suppose that neither of the
two defenses reaches the point where it applies – the mistake was
unreasonable (but not extremely unreasonable) and the defendant used
unreasonable (but not extremely unreasonable) force.78 Aggregating the
weights of the two “almost” defenses could lead to the defendant’s
acquittal. Courts, however, do not aggregate defenses, at least not
explicitly.
But even more interesting, cross-claim normative aggregation could
be made also across cases, when the same defendant committed several
“almost” offenses, and the aggregation of those “almost” offenses could
justify conviction. The next example illustrates such a case.
Example III.3. Several Minor Non-Criminal Misdeeds. Defendant is accused
of five separate offenses, allegedly committed in different times and places,
of interrupting with the work of a public official. Each behavior considered
separately does not reach the point where the behavior is defined as an
offense.

Under prevailing law the defendant would be acquitted of the five
charges brought against him.79 But if all cases are aggregated, the court
probability of conviction in a later case.
78
In State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1987), the defendant raised self-defense and
heat of passion provocation mitigation. He lost both defenses at trial, and was convicted of
murder in the first degree, but won the mitigation as a matter of law on appeal, where the
court reduced his conviction to voluntary manslaughter. It is doubtful whether he deserved
that defense, so a possible explanation for the decision is that the court implicitly engaged in
normative aggregation of two “almost” defenses. In Wesley Johnson v. State, 36 So. 3d 170
(Fla. App. 2010), the defendant raised two defense claims: that he was not present at the
place where the murder took place, and that the co-defendant’s fatal beating of the victim
was an unforeseen independent act falling outside of the original plan of the crime. The jury
denied both claims and convicted him of second-degree murder. The court affirmed the trial
court’s instructions to the jury. From the facts as presented by the court of appeals, it is
possible that there was one defense claim that was not established factually (the causation
claim) and another defense claim (unforeseen independent act) that was, if at all, an
“almost” defense claim. If this reading of the case is right, then a mixed aggregation (factual
and normative) could have brought a different result.
79
See e.g., State v. Stolen, 755 N.W.2d (Neb. 2008) (reversing the accused’s conviction on
the ground that physical interference is required in order to commit obstruction of
government operations); Ovide Duncantell v. State, 230 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. App. 2007) (The
defendant was convicted of interference with the duties of a public servant, since he
disregarded the officer’s repeated request to stand back. The court decided that by
repeatedly entering the crime scene area, the defendant interfered with the officer’s duty).
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could reach a different decision. Thus, if the behavior in each case is
reprehensible, but not reprehensible enough to justify the application of the
criminal law, the cumulative weight of all five cases could be more than
enough to justify such an application. We could think of two main reasons
why five cases could justify conviction even if one case does not: first,
maybe applying criminal law to one occurrence only is not cost-justified,
while with five occurrences it is cost-justified; second, the recurrence of the
same event five times may shed new light on the defendant’s behavior as a
whole and may justify convicting him.
However, criminal law has a number of aggregation doctrines which
allow courts to aggregate separate offenses (or “almost-offenses”) so as to
create an entirely new offense.
One example is the offense of stalking. Under anti-stalking acts, one
single behavior of stalking does not constitute an offense, but if that
behavior occurs several times, then at a certain point it becomes an
offense.80 The New Jersey Criminal Code, for example, defines stalking as
“repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person….”81
Thus, normative aggregation is allowed under the Code: a possible
interpretation of the Code is that one act of stalking is bad, but not bad
enough to justify the law’s intervention. A second interpretation is that one
act of stalking could be accidental with no malicious motives, and
therefore, in order to reduce the risk of false convictions, the law requires
for conviction more than one act of stalking.82
In other cases, a single behavior is an offense, but if that behavior is
repeated several times the series of offenses could constitute a more severe
offense. That could also be regarded as normative aggregation. A typical
example is the importation of drugs: if the accused imports drugs once and
the quantity is small enough he would be convicted of the offense of drug
possession of the first degree; if however the quantity is large enough, then
he would be convicted of the offense of a higher degree. The large quantity
condition could be satisfied even if the accused imports drugs several
times, each time the quantity is small, but the total quantity across all
occasions is large enough.83
80

See Heather C. Melton, Stalking: A Review of the Literature and Direction for the Future,
25 CRIM. JUST. REV. 246, 247 (2000) (stating that “[t]he term ‘stalking’ is used to describe
the willful, repeated, and malicious following, harassing, or threatening of another person”)
81
N.J. Stat. § 2C:12-10-a. For the New Jersey Superior Court’s interpretation of the stalking
clause, see State v. Cardell, 723 A. 2d 111 (N.J. Super. 1999).
82
In State v. Berg, 213 P.3d 1249 (Ore. 2009), the defendant was convicted with tampering
with a witness and stalking, based on allegations that he had repeatedly trespassed on his
neighbors’ property, engaged in aggressive and offensive conduct toward them, and
threatened one of them with various consequences if she showed up in court. The court
focused on one specific event and convicted the defendant. This decision might be
interpreted as an implicit aggregation of the numerous misbehaviors of the defendant, when
each of them standing alone would not constitute an offense.
83
In United States v. Shonubi, 802 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), the defendant, arriving
from Nigeria, was arrested at JFK International Airport with 427.4 grams of heroin. He was
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Another example of normative aggregation is the doctrine embedded
in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO).84 Under
RICO, a person who is a member of an enterprise that has committed any
two specified crimes within a ten-year period can be charged with
racketeering. Thus the offense of racketeering can be characterized as a
result of normative aggregation of two separate offenses (committed by an
enterprise) which can underlie a new offense (committed by an individual)
of belonging to a criminal enterprise.
This problem crops up in other settings. Police often have a good idea
of who are the local mischief-makers. In big cities, these people often
belong to criminal gangs. When rival gangs fight over turf and cause
disorder, the police have reason to suspect that many members of each
gang are involved but will not have sufficient proof to convict anyone of
the offense other than those who are directly involved. RICO tried to
address this problem, but proving the two separate crimes which are
necessary for applying RICO can also be too high a hurdle. Other laws,
such as Chicago’s gang loitering law,85 attempted to address this problem
indirectly by permitting the police to disperse groups of people if a known
gang member was present, and arrest anyone who failed to comply with
orders to disperse. We suspect that this law enabled police to, in effect,
aggregate claims against known mischief-makers—people who had
committed minor offenses (normative aggregation) or were reasonably
suspected of having been involved in serious offenses (factual
aggregation).
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
Cross person aggregation is largely absent in criminal law, probably
because it could infringe on the accused’s constitutional rights. Thus, if
there are several defendants accused of committing several crimes, none of
them will be convicted even if statistically each of them probably
committed some of the crimes. A market share liability approach, applied
by some jurisdictions to tort cases, is unlikely to be considered suitable for
criminal cases. In criminal trials the prosecution, in order to succeed,
should prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
charged with importing heroin and possessing heroin with intent to distribute it. The court
found that in addition to the last occasion where the defendant was arrested, he had made
seven other trips to Nigeria. The court concluded that those seven trips had been made for
the purpose of importing heroin, and therefore multiplied the quantity of 427.4 grams
imported on the time of arrest by eight and convicted the defendant for drug possession in
the 36th degree, instead of the 28th, thus doubling his prison sentence. The court decision
was reversed in United States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d. Cir.1997).
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statistical evidence cannot be the main evidence for conviction.86
However, RICO can be understood as a form of cross-person
aggregation. RICO is frequently used to target racketeering offenses in
which a large number of people are victims of minor offenses like drug
crimes and prostitution. Prosecutors have considerable discretion, and they
might choose not to prosecute the crimes individually because the harm to
each victim is relatively minor. RICO enables them to aggregate the
offenses, perhaps on the theory that the individually minor harm should be
considered significant when aggregated across victims. This type of crossperson aggregation might therefore be considered normative, but there is
also a factual version. Suppose that we cannot identify which of a number
of gang members committed certain crimes, but we can convict all of them
of belonging to a gang involved in a criminal enterprise. As a result, some
gang members may be, in effect, convicted of the crimes committed by
other gang members. Here, RICO permits factual aggregation (across
persons): we cannot connect any particular member to any particular
victims with confidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but we can be
confident that all the gang members committed a crime against at least
some of the victims.
This logic is most clearly visible in the doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise liability in international criminal law. The doctrine was invented
by the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadic case.87
Tadic belonged to a group of Serbian paramilitaries who engaged in ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia. He and his group entered a town for the purpose of
intimidating the local Bosnian residents; when they left, five of those
residents were dead. Tadic was initially acquitted of murder (which was, in
effect, the predicate offense of a crime against humanity, over which the
court had jurisdiction), because insufficient evidence connected him to the
killings. The Appeals Chamber reversed, holding that Tadic could be
convicted because he was part of a joint criminal enterprise and that the
killing of the victims was a foreseeable result of that enterprise.88 The
foreseeability requirement is inherently probabilistic: if a person joins a
group with an agenda of causing mayhem, that person’s expected liability
increases with the number of expected victims.
Joint criminal enterprise liability has been heavily criticized by
criminal law and some international law scholars, who believe that it
erodes the procedural protections of defendants. They argue that sympathy
for the victims of mass atrocity has caused governments and international
86
ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 183-5 (2005) (explaining why statistical
evidence, standing alone, cannot be the basis for conviction).
87
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion & Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
88
For a lucid discussion, see Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty
Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 104–07 (2005).

34

AGGREGATION AND LAW

lawyers to endorse international criminal law doctrines that are unfair to
defendants.89 From another perspective, however, the use of aggregation
rules for mass atrocities makes good sense. Normative aggregation may be
justified because relatively weak forms of complicity that are not
blameworthy in normal times may be considered blameworthy in times of
mass atrocity even if one does not go so far as to endorse collective
responsibility. Factual aggregation may also be justified because the large
number of victims may in itself raise the probability that a defendant was
criminally involved, as in the Tadic case.

IV. PUBLIC LAW
A. Factual Aggregation
In public law, problems of cross-claim factual aggregation arise in
numerous settings.90 Consider the following example of cross-claim factual
aggregation.
Example IV.1. Targeted Killing: Alternative Claims. The president seeks to
use military force to kill a terrorist suspect in Pakistan. However, there is
uncertainty both about whether the person is planning an attack on U.S.
targets, and about whether the person is a member of Al Qaida. Assume that
killing the person is lawful if either condition is valid. Suppose that the
probability of each independently is 40% and that the law requires a
probability of more than 50% to justify the killing.

We suspect that the president’s lawyers would advise him that he
cannot order the killing of the target. But if aggregation were accepted, the
probability that the killing would be lawful is 64 percent, and thus the
correct legal advice would be the opposite.
Now consider a case of cross-element factual aggregation.
Example IV.2. Targeted Killing: Cumulative Claims. Same as Example IV.1,
except suppose that the law provides that the killing is lawful only if the
target is a non-American and the target is planning an attack. The probability
that the target is a non-American is 60 percent, and the probability that the
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See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 88; George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin,
Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case, 3 J. INTER’L CRIM.
JUSTICE 539 (2005).
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As in the case of tort law, within-claim factual aggregation is ubiquitous and
unproblematic. See, e.g., Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (directing the
district court to evaluate the habeas petition by considering evidence “collectively rather
than in isolation”).
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target is planning an attack is 60 percent.

We believe that the president’s lawyers would advise him that he
cannot order the killing of the target because the probability that he is not
an American and is planning an attack is only 36 percent (at least if the
probabilities are independent—and they may not be). If we are right, then
factual aggregation is applied inconsistently—barred in the first case,
required in the second case. Our minimal suggestion is that factual
aggregation should be used consistently—if the president cannot order the
killing in the second case, then he must be permitted to do so in the first
case.
B. Normative Aggregation
As in the other legal settings we have examined, we can imagine cases
where cross-claim normative aggregation could occur.
Example IV.3. Targeted Killing: Two “Almost” Valid Claims. The president
seeks to use military force to kill an American citizen who is alleged to be
associated with Al Qaida and who lives in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen. The
president claims two sources of authority: a statute that gives him the
authority to use military force against Al Qaida; and his constitutional power
to use military force abroad to protect American interests. Each claim is at
best controversial—not everyone agrees that the statute authorizes actions
outside a conventional battlefield, nor that the president can use his
constitutional powers to kill an American citizen.

We suspect that most commentators believe that the president may use
military force only if each of his claims standing alone can be established.
Thus, in Example IV.3, the president would not be permitted to order a
targeted killing. Under the aggregation approach, one would reason
differently. The president has two “almost” claims—that under the statute
he can use force against a terrorist on foreign territory beyond the control
of domestic law enforcement authorities, even if not on the “battlefield”
strictly speaking, and that under the Constitution he can use force against
enemies abroad to protect American interests. If we aggregate these
“almost” claims, then the president arguably possesses the authority to
order a targeted killing in Example IV.3.
This argument might seem fanciful, but is fairly common in
constitutional adjudication involving the authority of the executive. In
Dames & Moore v. Regan,91 for example, the Supreme Court affirmed the
president’s authority to suspend American claims against Iran, based on
aggregation of statutory and constitutional powers:
91

453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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Although we have declined to conclude that the IEEPA or the Hostage
Act directly authorizes the President's suspension of claims for the
reasons noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress’
legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the President is
acting alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have
noted, Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every
possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every
possible situation in which he might act. Such failure of Congress
specifically to delegate authority does not, “especially ... in the areas
of foreign policy and national security,” imply “congressional
disapproval” of action taken by the Executive […] On the contrary,
the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the
President’s authority in a particular case which evinces legislative
intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to
“invite” “measures on independent presidential responsibility”92
The two statutes, the IEEPA and the Hostage Act, do not
independently authorize the president’s action, but they almost do; and this,
along with the president’s constitutional authority in the area (which also
does not by itself authorize the action but almost does), in the aggregate
provides the president with the claimed authority.
Another line of cases endorses cross-claim normative aggregation
where plaintiffs allege violations of the right to free exercise of religion.
Example IV.4. Free Exercise of Religion and Free Speech. A church
challenges a zoning ordinance that provides that only industrial structures
may be built in an area of city. The church argues that the zoning ordinance
violates both its constitutional right to free exercise of religion and its
constitutional right to speech. Taken separately, the claims would fail. The
zoning ordinance is a valid neutral law that does not discriminate against
religious organizations, and it does not put an unreasonable burden on speech.

In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court upheld a statute
denying unemployment benefits to a person who had illegally used peyote
in a religious ritual. Distinguishing (on controversial grounds) an earlier
precedent that held that laws that burden the free exercise of religion are
subject to strict scrutiny,93 the Court held that any “neutral and generally
applicable” law survives constitutional challenge under the Free Exercise
Clause even if it incidentally burdens religious practice. However, the
Court also recognized a “hybrid exception.” Where a plaintiff can show
that a neutral law burdens both religious practice and another
constitutionally protected activity, the law is subject to strict scrutiny, and
92
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therefore will be struck down unless the government can show a
compelling state interest.94
The hybrid rights exception fits our definition of cross-claim
normative aggregation. In the words of one scholar, “a less than sufficient
free exercise claim, plus a less than sufficient claim arising under a
different part of the Constitution, together trigger the compelling interest
test.”95 More formally, consider a claim that a statute violates two
provisions of the Constitution, X and Y, where the plaintiff can show that
the statute does not serve a compelling state interest under the strict
scrutiny test. Although the statute does not violate X or Y individually, it
does violate them jointly, and thus would be struck down.
The lower courts have heard numerous hybrid cases.96 Churches have
frequently challenged zoning ordinances on the grounds that the ordinances
violate the free exercise clause and the free speech clause (or the equal
protection clause). Each claim is individually weak: zoning ordinances are
usually neutral and generally applicable—for example, an ordinance might
permit only industrial buildings in an area where people want to build a
church—and so do not violate the free exercise clause by itself. And zoning
ordinances are rarely held to violate the free speech clause because the
ability to speak to an audience does not depend on having a building in a
particular area. Yet under the hybrid rights approach, a church could in
theory prevail as long as each individually losing claim is “colorable” or
exceeds some other threshold of plausibility.97
Another group of examples involves challenges to laws that allegedly

94
The Court did not apply the hybrid exception to the plaintiff’s claim, presumably because
the plaintiff alleged that only one constitutional norm was violated. The Court used the
hybrid exception to distinguish Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court struck down a neutral
law because of the burden it imposed on religious association. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The
Court’s reasoning has been harshly criticized by numerous commentators; among other
reasons, Yoder itself did not mention hybrid rights; the outcome was based solely on the
Free Exercise clause. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990).
95
Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation,
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Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 573 (2003); McConnell, supra
note 94. The authors argue that the doctrine makes no sense on its own terms, and has
sowed confusion among the lower courts. The Smith-related case law has been complicated
by the effect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.,
which we ignore because of our focus on constitutional issues.
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(holding that a church’s challenge to a zoning ordinance was a hybrid claim entitled to strict
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infringe on the parental right to educate one’s children. The right to educate
one’s children is a constitutional right, albeit a weak one, and parents
usually fail when they challenge truancy laws and schools’ educational
policies on the basis of this right. But when parents claim that educational
laws infringe on both their parental rights and their free exercise rights,
even though the laws are neutral and generally applicable, they make out a
hybrid claim and may obtain relief.98
Outside of Free Exercise, it is difficult to find clear examples of
recognition of hybrid rights, but in a number of cases the doctrinal logic
suggests such a theory. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the Court struck
down a state law that forced the Boy Scouts to admit a gay counselor in
violation of that organization’s bylaws.99 The Court held that the statute
violated Boy Scouts members’ right to “expressive association,” which
might be taken as a hybrid of the right to free speech and the right to
association.100 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a statute
that prohibited the sale of contraceptives.101 In a much-criticized opinion,
the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated a
right to privacy derived from the “emanations” of a number of different
rights in the Constitution, including rights in the First, Third, and Fourth
Amendments.102 Because the Court did not hold that the statute violated
any of these rights individually, the implication is that the statute was
unconstitutional only because it violated those rights jointly, although the
opinion certainly does not make this argument explicitly. Arguably, in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court derived a right of intimate
association (such as noninterference in family life) from the right to
association in the First Amendment and the right to due process in the
Fourteenth Amendments.103 Finally, it has been argued that several recent
Supreme Court cases are best understood as reflecting a hybrid claim
involving due process and equal protection rights.104 In Lawrence v.
Texas,105 for example, the court resisted the equal protection argument that
homosexuals form a suspect class, and the due process argument that a law
98
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prohibiting homosexual sodomy is substantively irrational—but, combining
concerns reflected in both clauses, concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional.106
Thus, we can identify two sorts of hybrid rights cases. The first is
where the constitutional claims are treated as separate, but a remedy is
granted if each claim is “colorable” or crosses some other threshold. The
second is where the courts develop the doctrine, creating a new right by
combining two or more recognized rights. Smith illustrates the first
approach: the Court refrained from recognizing a new right to, say,
“parental-religious control.” The right to privacy recognized in Griswold
illustrates the creation of a new right on the basis of two or more
recognized rights—somewhat analogous to the way the unconscionability
doctrine was developed so as to aggregate earlier-recognized claims.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that outside these
settings courts rarely respond sympathetically to hybrid claims. In Wilkie v.
Robbins,107 for example, the owner of a ranch claimed that officials from
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) engaged in a campaign of
harassment over a number of years, including trespasses, malicious
prosecutions, and the like, in an effort to compel him to grant an easement
to the U.S. government. The rancher argued that BLM’s campaign violated
the due process clause under the Fifth Amendment, and that BLM
retaliated against him for asserting his rights, which was a violation of the
First Amendment. The Court acknowledged that the harassment was
serious and highly objectionable, but rejected the Fifth Amendment
argument because the rancher had various legal remedies that he did not
pursue and the conduct fell short of a due process violation; similarly, it
rejected the First Amendment claim because the government’s purpose—to
obtain land—was not as clearly improper as its purpose in traditional
retaliation claims where the government objects to protected speech. What
is notable about this case is that the court evidently believed that BLM had
acted wrongfully, but did not consider the possibility that even if BLM did
not violate the Due Process Clause and the Free Speech Clause
individually, it did violate the two of them taken together (or a third, such
as the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits government conduct
motivated by animus108), by analogy to the hybrid rights cases. Indeed, this
approach is the norm—the hybrids rights cases are the exceptional cases.
Plaintiffs frequently argue constitutional rights violations in the alternative
and, outside the cases we discuss above, courts rarely address the
possibility that individually weak claims may be jointly strong.
For another example, consider United States v. Sanders, a case in
which a defendant was sentenced to a term of 37 months for committing a
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crime, was released at the end of his sentence, and then was sent back to
prison four years later after an appellate court (following substantial
delays) determined that his sentence should have been 180 months.109 The
defendant argued that reimprisonment after such a delay violated his rights
to substantive and procedural due process. Other courts had held that a
defendant who is sent back to prison as a result of an administrative error
could have a substantive due process claim based on the fact that he or she
had developed an expectation as to the finality of the sentence and that this
expectation was unfairly disappointed. By contrast, the Court held that
Sanders’ sentence had been appealed by both sides, so Sanders had no
reason to believe that his sentence was final. The Court also rejected
Sanders’ procedural due process claim, noting that although the four-year
delay was severe, Sanders could not show that it resulted from bad faith or
an attempt by the government to gain tactical advantage. The substantive
due process and procedural due process claims were colorable; but
individually they were too weak to warrant relief.
The dissent argued that Sanders should be released, based on an
analysis that, in the majority’s words, “seems to conflate the procedural due
process factors … with the substantive due process right … to create a sort
of hybrid right not to be returned to prison.”110 The dissent, in essence,
argued that even if the substantive due process violation was not as serious
as in other cases (Sanders’ expectation about his sentence should not have
been as “crystallized” as in a clerical error case since the sentence was on
appeal), and the procedural due process claim was not as serious as in other
cases (the delay was significant but not caused by bad faith), the violations
jointly considered entitled Sanders to relief. Like the Supreme Court in the
Roberts case, the dissent sought to assert a new hybrid right that was based
on two recognized constitutional rights that were independently too weak
to justify a constitutional remedy.
C. Cross-Person Aggregation
As we saw in Part I, tort law permits aggregation only on occasion,
and otherwise falls well short of what aggregation would require. Recall,
for instance, Example 1.7, which involved a mass tort with indeterminate
victims. Defendant’s factory pollutes, creating a statistical likelihood of
harming an additional 25 people per year, but none of those people can be
identified. Tort law does not engage in cross-person aggregation; a remedy
is not available. Tort law also does not usually permit cross-claim factual
aggregation and normative aggregation. Because of these limitations,
Congress and state legislatures have enacted numerous statutes that
regulate behavior that otherwise slips through tort law. This is an important
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domain of public law. Indeed, this type of regulation is ubiquitous—
consider speed limits, for example, which protect unidentified future
victims by regulating ex ante—and the proposition that public law
overcomes the anti-aggregation bias in private law by permitting crossperson aggregation is understood in the literature, even if not put in those
terms.111 But it is worth dwelling on this point, for it shows clearly that the
anti-aggregation bias in private law is (at least, with respect to cross-person
aggregation) not based on any fundamental moral commitments.
For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will
typically identify sources of pollution such as factories, and conduct studies
that determine whether the pollution emitted by those factories causes
harm. The agency can rarely identify particular people who have been
harmed because of the difficulty of untangling other causal factors. But the
agency can use statistical techniques to determine the difference between
the number of cases of, say, lung cancer in the population exposed to the
pollution as well as to background factors, and the number of cases of lung
cancer in a population exposed to the background factors alone. If the
difference is large enough, the agency will issue regulations requiring the
factories to reduce their pollution. No victim receives a remedy, but in
future there will be fewer victims. This is a clear example of cross-person
aggregation.112
Public law also addresses governmental harms by aggregating across
persons. One example involves religious displays on public property, which
are forbidden under the First Amendment if they are sectarian.113 One way
of thinking about religious displays is that they inflict a non-physical, and
hence difficult-to-prove but nonetheless important psychic harm on people
outside the religion that the display celebrates. Accordingly, if only one
religious dissenter saw a display, she would be unable to prove that she was
harmed, but if many religious dissenters saw the display, it is statistically
likely that at least one of them was harmed. The law gives even a single
individual standing to bring a claim, but in effect on behalf of the group.
This approach can be contrasted to the law’s reluctance to give remedies to
tort victims who claim emotional but not physical harm.114 The difference
is that religious displays by their nature are observed by large groups of
people so that small likelihoods of harm can be aggregated, whereas torts
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that cause emotional harms generally involve only single victims.115
V. EXPLANATIONS AND PROPOSALS
A. The Arbitrariness of Legal Boundaries
The best explanation for the aggregation puzzles is that the division of
the legal system into bodies of law, and then those bodies of law into
separate claims, and then again those claims into elements, brings costs as
well as benefits. Courts respond to those costs by aggregating under certain
circumstances, but because they respond in a cautious, ad hoc way, fearful
of sacrificing the benefits of disaggregation, the law as a whole contains
many inconsistencies.
To understand this problem, we start with factual aggregation and
return to our first example from tort law. The general effect of tort law is
twofold: to optimally deter people from imposing externalities on each
other and sometimes116 to compensate people who have suffered from those
externalities. An ideal decisionmaker, who faced no decision costs, could
be given a simple instruction, such as “maximize social welfare” or
“minimize social costs.” Such a decisionmaker would be required to
aggregate harms and probabilities in all circumstances. So, for example, the
decisionmaker would hold liable the defendant who acted negligently with
40 percent probability while driving a vehicle that was inherently
dangerous with 40 percent probability (Example I.1). The explanation is
straightforward. If a person is considering whether to engage in these
actions, and knows that she will not be held liable because her behavior
falls between the cracks of two claims, she will engage in those actions,
even though in an expected sense they will cause harm which is higher than
their benefit. By holding such a person liable, the ideal decisionmaker
deters socially costly behavior.
But as the literature on rules versus standards makes clear,117 such a
system of pure standards would not function effectively in a world in which
decision costs are often high. The preponderance of the evidence rule
greatly simplifies decisionmaking; if courts were required to make point
estimates and combine them, then their job would be more difficult. It
would also be more difficult for parties to predict the legal consequences of
their behavior.118
115
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We turn now to normative aggregation. Take Example II.2 (NonMaterial Breach and Minor Fraudulent Misrepresentation), where
defendant engages in a minor form of fraudulent misrepresentation in order
to secure plaintiff’s consent to a contract and subsequently engages in a
breach that falls just short of material. A court would not allow the plaintiff
to rescind the contract because each claim is considered separately.
Aggregation would create a more complicated rule for both the parties to
the contract and the courts, and thus increase decision costs. Rather than
determine (1) whether the fraudulent misrepresentation crosses a threshold,
and (2) whether the breach crosses a threshold, the court would be required
to determine (1) whether the fraudulent misrepresentation crosses a
threshold, (2) whether the breach crosses a threshold, and (3) whether the
combined actions cross a different threshold. This more complicated test
may well create an unacceptable level of difficulty and uncertainty. But
non-aggregation also entails costs: it permits a defendant to escape liability
for two actions that are jointly, by assumption, inefficient or unjust.
This argument explains why one can more easily find examples of
within-claim factual aggregation than cross-claim factual aggregation and
normative aggregation, and why courts are more likely to aggregate claims
of a similar nature than claims of a different nature. Consider, for example,
a case where a plaintiff can show that defendant committed a tort against
him with 40% probability and a breach of contract against him with 40%
probability. Combining the breach and tort claims raises possible
complexities and unintended consequences: for example, if there are
different statutes of limitation for contract claims and tort claims, which
statute should be used when the claims are combined? And if the suit is for
damages, there could be different damages rules for breach of contract and
tort, so a question arises as to which damages rule should be used when the
claims are combined.119 By contrast, when the claims are of the same
nature, no such conflicts arise.
Should the law aggregate more than it does? Our minimal suggestion
is that the doctrine is currently inconsistent, but we suspect that the answer
is yes. Courts should recognize when they aggregate and when they do not,
and explain why they aggregate in some cases and not others. They should
be open to aggregation arguments from litigants, which in many cases
could change outcomes. They should also realize that litigants who make
aggregation arguments can draw analogies to established norms and
patterns in the law that already recognize aggregation, as we have shown.
And when decision costs are low, factual aggregation and normative
aggregation should clearly improve legal outcomes. Factual aggregation
will generally improve the accuracy of adjudication while not changing
aggregation.
119
Note that these questions are much less acute when the plaintiff is able to establish both
tort and contract claims separately. In the latter case the plaintiff would generally be entitled
to the remedy that is more favorable to him.
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substantive law. Normative aggregation should improve substantive law—
in the sense of vindicating values and policy choices that are already found
in the law, but which defendants can violate if claims are not aggregated.
To be sure, there are cases in which aggregation is unnecessary and
possibly harmful, and we will address them in the Conclusion.
B. Other Explanations and Possible Objections to Aggregation
There could be other explanations for courts’ reluctance to aggregate.
Those explanations could also be grounds for objections to aggregation.
Most of the explanations – or objections – relate to one type of aggregation
but not others, or to aggregation in one field of the law but not others.
Some of the explanations – or objections – are efficiency-related but others
are not.
1. Corrective Justice
Under the principles of corrective justice, the defendant should rectify
the injustice he inflicted upon the plaintiff through his wrongdoing by
compensating her for the harm done. Theorists of corrective justice
maintain that it is crucial that the defendant rectifies the injustice done to
the plaintiff and not to an unaffected third party.120 Moreover, under
corrective justice theories, the determination of liability should rest upon
the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff as doer and sufferer,
and anything outside that relationship should be ignored.121
We expect corrective justice theorists to oppose cross-person
aggregation, since such aggregation would require taking into account
wrongs committed toward third parties while determining the remedies
available to the plaintiff against the defendant. Thus, in Example I.7 (Mass
Torts: Indeterminate Plaintiffs), a factory wrongfully created radiation, and
while it can be established that 25 out of 125 people suffered harm due to
the radiation, it is impossible for each plaintiff to establish, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that her harm is the result of the radiation.
Corrective justice theorists would maintain that all suits should be
dismissed since in each and every case it is more probable than not that the
defendant did not injure the plaintiff. The mere fact that there are many
plaintiffs, and that 25 of them probably suffered harm as a result of the
defendant’s wrongdoing, should be considered under corrective justice as
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JULES COLEMAN, RISK AND WRONGS 380–85 (2003) (discussing the focus of corrective
justice on the relationship between the injurer and the victim); ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA
OF PRIVATE LAW 63–66 (1995) (same).
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This is an implication of the correlativity requirement, under which liability should be
imposed for harms which are the materialization of the risks that defined the injurer’s
conduct as negligent. See WEINRIB, supra note 120, at 159 (“The consequences for which
the defendant is liable are restricted to those within the risks that render the act wrongful in
the first place.”)
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irrelevant to the determination of liability.122 Market share liability,
however, could be reconciled at least with some versions of corrective
justice.123
We see no reason for corrective justice theorists to oppose cross-claim
factual aggregation or normative aggregation if it relates to one specific
event. The harder case is when there are two separate events occurring
between the defendant and the plaintiff, none of them can be established by
the preponderance of the evidence to justify liability, but it can be
established by the preponderance of the evidence that at least one of them
justifies liability. We suspect that corrective justice theorists would oppose
such aggregation, arguing that each event should be considered separately
and in isolation from one another. Thus, in Example I.3 (Injury in the
Hospital: Two Events, Two Injuries), a patient suffered two distinct harms,
each of which might be caused by a different doctor. The hospital is
vicariously liable for both doctors’ wrongdoing. While the patient cannot
establish the liability of each doctor, he can establish that at least one of the
harms was caused by a doctor’s wrongdoing. Corrective justice theorists
would probably argue that each event should be considered separately: the
determination of liability should be done per event, and not across events
(we suspect that corrective justice theorists would persist on that view,
even if in our example the two harms might have been the result of the
same doctor’s wrongdoing).124 In any event, while it is possible that
corrective justice intuitions may account for limits on some types of
aggregation, they cannot explain the bias against aggregation in most cases.
2. Incommensurability
In law and economics it is assumed that all potential outcomes are
commensurable and comparable to one another. But there are also different
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WEINRIB, supra note 120, at 63–66 (explaining that corrective justice focuses only on the
relationship between the injurer and the victim, and implying that those two should be
identified); Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321, 330–39 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (arguing against
liability for lost chances of recovery in the absence of reliance or lost opportunities for
alternative treatment).
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Corrective justice will support probabilistic recovery when three cumulative conditions
are met: 1) the wrongdoers pay for the harm caused by their wrongdoings; 2) the victims are
compensated for the harm wrongfully caused to them; and 3) the wrongdoers make
payments to or participate in the mechanism that facilitates the compensation of their
victims. These three conditions are satisfied in the DES cases, as well as in other cases of
recurring wrongs: a group of wrongdoers inflict harms numerous times on a group of
victims; the harm caused by each wrongdoer and the harm caused to each victim is
verifiable; but it is impossible for each victim to prove the identity of the specific
wrongdoer, from the group of wrongdoers, who caused her harm. See PORAT & STEIN, supra
note 20, at 132–33.
124
Corrective justice may support liability if the two events can be reasonably understood as
one event occurring in two stages.
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views.125 A possible explanation for courts’ reluctance to engage in some
aggregations but not in others is their refusal to evaluate claims of a
different nature according to one common scale.
Take example II.1 (Either Material Breach or Fraudulent
Misrepresentation), and II.2 (Non-Material Breach and Minor Fraudulent
Misrepresentation). Both examples deal with a case where the plaintiff
argues that he was entitled to rescind a contract since the defendant
engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation in order to secure plaintiff’s
consent to the contract and subsequently breached the contract. In Example
II.1 there is a 40% probability that each of the two claims holds, while in
Example II.2, although the facts are not disputed, both the
misrepresentation and the breach, standing alone, are not severe enough to
justify the rescission of the contract. In order to aggregate both claims in
both examples, it seems that courts need a common scale to measure
misrepresentation on the one hand and breach on the other hand. Finding
such a scale is just impossible – or so the commensurability objection
would be.
The commensurability objection would probably be more applicable
to Example II.2 than to Example II.1. In Example II.1 the court just needs
to estimate the probability that the defendant behaved in a way that
warrants the rescission of the contract by the plaintiff, and this does not
require measuring fraudulent misrepresentation and breach according to
one common scale. Example II.2 is more complex. In this Example the
court would have to decide whether “almost” fraudulent misrepresentation
combined with “almost” material breach, are sufficient for rescission. The
court would need some common scale to evaluate both misbehaviors and
aggregate them.
Or take the question, raised in our discussion of both tort law and
criminal law, of whether two “almost” defenses should be sufficient to
establish a valid defense (insanity and failure to mitigate in a tort case
(Example I.5), or mistake and self defense in a criminal case). Here too the
defenses have different rationales and any aggregation would be much
more than aggregating probabilities in the other examples which involve
just factual uncertainty. To aggregate, a court would need to consider the
underlying rationales directly and create a new scale that reflects the
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See generally, INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth
Chang ed., 1997). See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical
Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1199 (1997)
(arguing that “[a] commitment to the commensurability of all an agent’s ends runs very deep
in the Law and Economics movement” but that it fails to describe the real world); see also
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1–16 (1993) (arguing for a
pluralist approach to the valuation of goods, based on the idea that goods differ in kind or
quality from one another and cannot always be measured by a common criterion); Amartya
Sen, Plural Utility, 81 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 193, 193–210 (1981) (arguing that
welfare economics should understand utility “primarily as a vector (with several distinct
components), and only secondarily as some homogeneous magnitude”).
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relevant theoretical considerations.
The same objection could be raised with respect to cases illustrated by
our constitutional law example IV.3 (Targeted Killing: Cumulative
Claims). In this example, the president claims two sources of authority for
a targeted killing: a statute that gives him the authority to use military force
against Al Qaida, and his constitutional power to use military force abroad
to protect American interests. Here too, assuming none of the legal sources
provides the authority for target killing in the case at hand, a question arises
of whether aggregation could lead to a different outcome. Since the
rationales for the two authorizing legal sources are different, aggregation
needs a common scale according to which the combined weight of the two
sources as applied to the case at hand would be evaluated.
The commensurability argument might be doubted, however, because
the main philosophically distinctive concern about commensurability is that
values are incommensurable, and treating them as commensurable may do
violence to our moral intuitions. This philosophical concern has little to do
with how the law should be divided into claims, and claims into elements,
which reflects institutional rather than moral considerations. Indeed,
sometimes comparing values of a different nature raises implementation
difficulties, and those difficulties should be taken into account in
considering the desirability of some kinds of aggregations. But then the
commensurability argument appears to be just another way to make the
argument that aggregation has costs of implementation, as we have shown
in section A above.
3. Cognitive Limitations
Aggregation requires a kind of mental manipulation that might
flummox judges and juries. Consider factual aggregation. Courts do not use
precise standards of proof like 40%, 51%, and 95%. Instead, the standards
of proof are expressed in verbal formulations: preponderance of the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt. Given this constraint, courts would
need to give juries awkward instructions: “find in favor of plaintiff if either
claim #1 or claim #2 is supported by preponderance of the evidence, or if
claim #1 and claim #2 jointly are supported by the preponderance of the
evidence even if they individually are not.” In cases involving a large
number of claims, the jury instructions could quickly get out of hand. But
even in simple cases, like the one above, one might wonder whether juries
are capable of making such fine gradations in likelihood, which would,
among other things, require them to implicitly calculate joint probabilities
while taking into account the degree of dependence if any between the two
events.126
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See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases
for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115 (1987) (describing psychological
research that suggests that people’s minds process external stimuli by breaking them down
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A similar problem could also upset normative aggregation. For
Example II.1 (Either Material Breach or Fraudulent Misrepresentation), the
court would instruct the jury to “find for plaintiff if defendant’s statements
were fraudulent, defendant’s breach was material, or the two actions were
sufficiently serious as to warrant rescission.” For Example IV.4 (Free
Exercise of Religion and Free Speech), the court would find for plaintiff if
the law singled out religion and imposed a burden on it, imposed an
unreasonable burden on free speech, or did not have either effect but
imposed an unreasonable burden on plaintiff’s joint religion-speech rights.
As in the case of factual aggregation, one might worry that juries and
judges would be incapable of making the sort of fine-grained judgments
that aggregation typically requires.127
Our response to the objections in both cases is that, while these
concerns are serious, they are also marginal: the law already requires legal
decisionmakers to engage in this type of mental manipulation. Legal
standards require decisionmakers to aggregate factual information and
normative considerations. Juries already must weigh probabilities of
events, and take into account the extent of dependence of events—for
example, whether two witnesses who give the same testimony are entitled
to extra weight because they are independent sources of information or not
because they might have collaborated or drawn on the same source of
knowledge. Thus, while cognitive limitations should play a role in the
design of legal doctrine, including the uses of aggregation, they cannot by
themselves provide a sufficient reason for rejecting aggregation.

CONCLUSION
We have analyzed three types of aggregation in the law through
various examples in four central legal fields. In most of our examples,
courts do not aggregate. Furthermore, in most of the examples a noaggregation rule is taken by courts for granted, as if no other choice exists.
This is puzzling since courts sometimes do aggregate, and on many
occasions the aggregation rule better serves the substantive goals of the
law. In the next paragraphs we summarize our conclusions and provide

into a small number of discrete categories rather than points on a probability distribution);
Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and
Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOLOGY, PUB. POL’Y, &
LAW 769 (2000) (discussing psychological literature on jurors’ ability to distinguish
standards of proof). Levmore, supra note 7, at 739–45, makes the interesting argument,
based on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, that if all (or a supermajority of the) members of the
jury believes that a factual allegation is more probable than not, say, by a probability of
51%, than the probability of the allegation being true is in fact much higher than 51%.
Levmore suggests that this could be a reason not to aggregate, mainly in cases that we called
cross-element aggregation in this Article.
127
The research described in Clermont, supra note 126, bears on this question as well.
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recommendations for reform.
Factual aggregation. Within-claim factual aggregation is routine and
raises no problems. Cross-element factual aggregation is somewhat more
complex, but is sometimes recognized in the law. Cross-claim factual
aggregation can cause more serious difficulties because various and
sometimes unpredictable legal consequences flow from the use of different
claims. For this reason, cross-claim factual aggregation should be avoided
when aggregation provides no, or minimal, benefits. We identified a few
such cases: for example, when aggregation of probabilities cancel out ex
post, and so have no effect on ex ante incentives, where the law is
concerned only with those ex ante incentives.128 Cross-claim factual
aggregation should also be avoided when it involves a high level of
difficulty and may confuse the jury—for example, when the probabilities
are to a high degree dependent.129
Otherwise, courts should engage in cross-claim factual aggregation. It
is important to understand that cross-claim factual aggregation does not
require judges or juries to calculate probabilities accurately; instead, the
court should ask itself whether the probability that at least one of two (or
more) claims is valid was proven at the level of proof required by the law
(preponderance of the evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, and so forth).
Cross-claim factual aggregation does not require courts to do something
different in nature from what they normally do—within-claim aggregation.
Instead of asking whether claim A is more probable than not, they should
ask whether it is more probable than not that at least one of the two claims
A and B holds.
Note also that cross-claim factual aggregation should not have any
effect on legal norms, that is, substantive law. Its sole effect will be on the
accuracy of adjudication. If courts engaged in cross-claim factual
aggregation, then people would be more likely to conform their behavior to
the requirements of the law.
Normative aggregation. Normative aggregation, like factual
aggregation, is not always called for. We saw a number of cases where
normative aggregation makes little sense because of the nature of the
substantive law in question. For example, from an economic perspective,
“almost” negligent behavior is actually socially desirable; so two or more
instances of “almost” negligent behavior is even more socially desirable
rather than less.130 From a more conventional moral perspective, we suspect
that two or more negligent homicides would not be considered as morally
blameworthy as a single intentional homicide—although threshold
deontologists might permit aggregation above a certain level.131
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See supra text accompanying notes 18–21.
See supra text accompanying note 25.
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See supra text following note 29.
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It may also be difficult for decisionmakers to make fine gradations of
social harm or moral wrongfulness, or, even if they can, for a jury to come
to a consensus about these matters. We suspect that considerations of this
sort lie behind the hostility to hybrid rights in constitutional law. But, as we
have emphasized, people make these sorts of judgments all the time, and
expansive standard-like norms in the law require such judgments without
creating insurmountable difficulties in practice.
Normative aggregation falls somewhere in the middle of the
continuum between rules and standards, but it is also special because it uses
existing law as building blocks rather than constructing a new norm. While
standards require the court to apply policy or normative considerations
directly to the dispute, normative aggregation requires the court to apply
existing rules albeit in combination. The advantage of normative
aggregation is that it provides more certainty and hence guidance than pure
standards do.
As we have noted, normative aggregation takes two forms. First,
courts might directly or explicitly aggregate claims, exemplified by the
hybrid rights jurisprudence. This form of decision-making has an ad hoc,
almost remedial quality. The plaintiff shows that she has two claims, each
has normative weight which by itself is not enough to justify a remedy, but
the cumulative normative weight of the two claims is enough to justify a
remedy.
Second, courts might indirectly aggregate claims by using the old
claims as building blocks for constructing new claims. The
unconscionability doctrine illustrates this process. A plaintiff has two
claims under an old legal regime which are individually weak but jointly
powerful; rather than give plaintiff a remedy based on the judgment that the
claims are jointly strong, the court recognizes a new claim that reflects the
considerations that separately underlie the old claims. This may well be one
way that the law develops over time.132
Cross-person aggregation. Cross-person aggregation can be both
factual and normative. In many cases, the distinction is not always clear.
For example, joint criminal enterprise liability enables courts to convict a
defendant who, beyond a reasonable doubt, participated in crimes against at
least one of a group of victims when, however, the identity of her specific
victims cannot be ascertained. The same doctrine also enables courts to
convict a defendant of a serious crime when she, beyond a reasonable
(“…moderate deontology holds that constraints have thresholds. A constraint may be
overridden for the sake of furthering good outcomes or avoiding bad ones if enough good or
bad is at stake”).
132
It has been frequently argued that the law has been evolving from rules toward standards.
See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (1992). If so, one part of that process may result from the type of indirect
aggregation described in the text, where courts replace narrow, rule-like claims with
broader, standard-like claims that aggregate the policy concerns that had previously been
distributed among the narrower claims.
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doubt, participated in minor crimes that harmed a large number of victims.
Cross-person aggregation is in tension with traditional legal doctrines
that protect the rights of defendants. These doctrines are particularly strong
in criminal procedure; but they exist in civil procedure as well. These
doctrines are very old, and they are celebrated for, among other things,
eliminating the influence of morally reprehensible norms that at one time
played a significant role in legal systems—for example, holding children
liable for the crimes of their parents, or members of religious or ethnic
groups liable for the crimes of other members. The doctrines forced the
government to show the moral culpability of the defendant, and the causal
connection between her actions and the harm to a victim. But this
requirement of showing the identity of the victim turns out to be a
significant hurdle to justice in a world in which harms are often dispersed
and their sources difficult to trace. Cross-person aggregation permits courts
to overcome this hurdle without at the same time increasing the risk that
people will be punished for harms that they did not cause.
We opened the Article with an observation that while individuals
aggregate reasons for decisions in their daily life they tend not to expose
this way of reasoning to other people. It would not be surprising if judges
and jurors also aggregate more than they say they do.
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